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This Article begins with a question: Why is RICO used so infreqIuently?
RICO, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), both a
civil cause of action and a crime, was passed in 1970 with much fanfare.2 The
fanfare was deserved. RICO was an imaginative criminal justice initiative aimed

1. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922,
941-47 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2006 & Supp. V 2012)).
2. Relevant legislative history on RICO includes: Organized Crime ControlAct of 1969:
Hearings on S. 30 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. (1970)
[hereinafter Hearings: Organized Crime Control]; H.R. REP. No. 91-1549 (1970); S. REP. No. 91617, at 76-83 (1969); S. REP. NO. 81-2370, at 16 (1950).
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at complex, systemic crime. RICO's civil cause of action was viewed as a robust
tool for plaintiffs and a vital supplement to strained law enforcement resources.
After conducting an in-depth analysis of RICO opinions rendered by the federal
appellate courts over a seven-year time period, from 2005 to 2011, this Article
suggests an answer to the question initially posed: Criminal RICO's time has
come and gone; civil RICO's time has not yet arrived.
The data analyzed in this Article suggest that criminal RICO is
anachronistic. Simpler, more streamlined statutes are now available to achieve
far more easily the benefits criminal RICO used to uniquely bestow: providing
context for isolated acts, linking far-flung actors, penetrating organizations to
reach key players, providing stiff sentences, and obtaining forfeiture of property
used to commit crime and reaped from crime. Analysis of the data herein further
suggests that civil RICO, on the other hand, is an untapped resource. Used
properly, civil RICO is an optimal private attorney tool and a boon for plaintiffs,
particularly in class actions. This is true for two reasons. First, RICO mandates
treble damages at a time when-because of court rulings and legislative
actions-many plaintiffs are limited to single damages. Second, in light of
recent court rulings in RICO cases, RICO's elements dovetail with the class
action requirements of commonality and predominance, making RICO class
actions particularly viable. Civil RICO also has potential for significant use in
the pharmaceutical fraud area because of recent court decisions, which have
spelled out exactly what plaintiffs must do to successfully plead and prove RICO
in such cases.
This Article proceeds in eight parts. Part I provides an overview of the
RICO statute. Part II explains the methodology used to gather the data in this
study. Part III discusses quantitative analysis from the data, including how many
RICO cases are decided each year and where they are brought. Part IV describes
the types of RICO cases brought under both criminal and civil RICO provisions.
Part V analyzes the outcomes in RICO cases, including who wins, who loses,
and which circuits favor which side. Part VI examines the issues that have
dominated RICO court decisions, discussing how recent court decisions on
"pattern," "enterprise," and proximate causation make civil RICO cases easier to
plead and prove. Part VII focuses on RICO class actions, discussing past and
future trends, successes, and failures.
Finally, Part VII focuses on
pharmaceutical fraud cases, noting why they are especially ripe for use of civil
RICO, and Part VIII concludes.
I. OVERVIEW OF RICO
The RICO statute applies to a wide range of conduct and contains abstract
terms "not easily correlated with everyday experience." 3 There are four types of

3.

JED S. RAKOFF & HOWARD

STRATEGY

§ 1.01

(2003).

W.

GOLDSTEIN, RICO: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAW AND
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conduct prohibited by RICO: (1) investing proceeds from a pattern of
racketeering activity in an enterprise,4 (2) acquiring or maintaining control over
an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity,5 (3) conducting or
participating in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity,6 and (4) conspiring to do any of these types of conduct.
RICO is a complex and unusual statute.8 It is one of the few statutes that
specify both a criminal offense and a civil cause of action. RICO may be
prosecuted by United States Department of Justice prosecutors-either
criminally or civilly-or it may be brought as a civil suit by private individuals
who suffered damage to their business or property.9 Criminal RICO carries stiff
penalties: a possible prison term of twenty years, forfeiture of property acquired
or maintained in violation of RICO,10 and fines of $250,000 per offense$500,000 per offense if the defendant is an organization.11 Civil RICO is
similarly formidable, as those found liable pay treble damages, as well as
attorney's fees and costs. 12
RICO's civil cause of action, which is available to "[a]ny person injured in
his business or property by reason of a violation" of RICO, requires RICO
plaintiffs to prove that the defendants committed crimes.14 Thus, in addition to
proving the "RICO elements" of "pattern" and "enterprise," private plaintiffs in
civil RICO actions must prove the elements of the crimes they allege as

4. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2006). Furthermore, RICO specifies that the "enterprise" must not
be one that is "engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce."
§1962(a)-(c).
5. §1962(b).
6. § 1962(c).
7. § 1962(d).
8. See, e.g., Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 19 (2010) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the statutory framework of RICO is complex); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Inrex
Co., 473 U.S. 479, 527 (1985) (referring to RICO as a "complex statute").
Excellent resources on RICO include: JED S. RAKOFF & HOWARD W. GOLDSTEIN, RICO:
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAW AND STRATEGY (1989); G. Robert Blakey & Brian Gettings, Racketeer

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations(RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminaland Civil Remedies, 53
TEMP. L.Q. 1009 (1980); G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil FraudAction in Context: Reflections
on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237 (1982); James D. Calder, RICO's

"Troubled... Transition": Organized Crime, Strategic InstitutionalFactors, and Implementation
Delay, 1971-1981, 25 CRIM. JUST. REV. 31 (2000); Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime ofBeing a
Criminal, Parts I& II, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 661 (1987).
9. 18 U.S.C. §1964(c) (2006).
10. 18 U.S.C. §1963(a) (2006).
11. 18 U.S.C. §3571(a)(3), (c)(3) (2006). A court also is authorized to fine the defendant
"not more than twice the gross profits or other proceeds" derived from this offense. § 1963(a).
12. §1964(c).
13. Id.
14. § 1964(a-c) (requiring a pattern of racketeering activity); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)
(2006) (listing the crimes that qualify as a "racketeering activity" for the purpose of establishing a
pattern).
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"racketeering activity."15
If plaintiffs allege money laundering as the
racketeering activity, for example, they must prove that the defendants (1) with
the intent to promote or carry on a specified unlawful activity, such as mail
fraud, (2) knowing that the transaction is designed to disguise the nature of the
proceeds from the mail fraud, (3) conducts or attempts to conduct a financial
transaction that involves the proceeds from the mail fraud.16 The elements
plaintiffs are required to prove are the same elements federal prosecutors must
prove when prosecuting a criminal case alleging money laundering.17 In a RICO
civil action, plaintiffs prove these elements by a preponderance of the evidence
rather than beyond a reasonable doubt.18
RICO contains three terms of art: (1) "racketeering activity," (2) "pattern" of
racketeering activity, and (3) "enterprise." 1 9 Section 1961(1) of RICO provides
a list of crimes that qualify as "racketeering activity." 20 Generic state crimes
(such as murder, kidnapping, and robbery) and approximately 150 specifically
enumerated federal offenses qualify as "racketeering activities." 21 "Racketeering
activity" encompasses a large variety of white-collar offenses including financial
institution fraud, naturalization and immigration fraud, bankruptcy fraud, money
laundering, and media and computer program counterfeiting.22
A person becomes liable under RICO by committing a pattern of
racketeering activity.23 RICO defines a "pattern of racketeering activity" as at
least two acts of racketeering activity occurring within a ten-year time period.24
According to the Supreme Court, racketeering acts must be related to each
other-but not so related that the acts merge into one act2 5-and must also

15. See Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogcrs, 834 F.2d 1297, 1302 (7th Cir. 1987) ("[M]any lower
courts ... havc reached the conclusion that proof [of the predicate act] by a preponderance of the
evidence is sufficient to establish a civil violation of section 1962.").
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2006).
17. Id.
18. Sedima, S.P.RL. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 491 (1985) (noting that "[t]here is no
indication that Congress sought to depart from this general" preponderance standard of proof for
civil RICO actions).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), (4), (5) (2006).
20. § 1961(1).
21. Id.
22. § 1961(1).
23. § 1962.
24. § 1961(5) ("[A] 'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least two acts of racketeering
activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred
within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of
racketeering activity[.]").
25. This issue of whether the acts are related enough to satisfy HJ. Inc.'s "relatedness"
requirement, but not so related as to merge into one act (thus defeating RICO's requirement of two
racketeering activities), arises in RICO cases where mail fraud (or mail fraud analogs, such as wire
fraud, bank fraud, and health care fraud) is alleged as the racketeering activity. See, e.g., Al-Abood
ex rel. Al-Abood v. El-Shamari, 217 F.3d 225, 238 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Anderson v. Found. for
Advancement, Educ. & Emp't of Am. Indians, 155 F.3d 500, 506 (4th Cir. 1998); Menasco, Inc. v.
Wasserman, 886 F.2d 681, 684 (4th Cir. 1989)). Some courts have held that two or more schemes
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demonstrate "continuity" to satisfy RICO's pattern requirement.
Continuity
may be shown by a series of related predicates "extending over a substantial
period of time" or over a shorter period of time if they "threaten[] ... future
criminal conduct." 2 7 Part VI.A of this Article discusses the pattern requirement.
Enterprise is defined in the statute as "any individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." Enterprise is also a
fluid concept,29 as discussed in Part VI.B of this Article.
The courts have created an extensive body of common law for civil RICO
regarding these terms of art, as well as proximate causation,30 compensable
damage, standing, 32 reliance, 3 3 and statute of limitations. 34
II. METHODOLOGY

The data analyzed in this Article consists of all the RICO opinions rendered
by the federal courts of appeals between 2005 and 2011.35 Reported and

to defraud are needed since the various mailings merge into one scheme. See RAKOFF &
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, §1.04[2][b][iii]. In contrast, other courts have held that separate
mailings, even in perpetration of a single scheme, are separate acts. Id.
26. H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989).
27. Id. at 242 (noting that a "pattern" must show a "relationship" among the racketeering acts
and "continuity" of the acts).
28. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2006).
29. See Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi., 747 F.2d 384, 401 (7th Cir.
1984) ("Discussion of this person/enterprise problem under RICO can easily slip into a
metaphysical or ontological style of discourse ... ?").
30. See, e.g., Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 460-61 (2006) (noting that the
civil RICO proximate cause requirement prevents indirect injuries from becoming an actionable
harm); Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992) (holding that civil RICO
requires a showing of proximate causation).
31. See, e.g., Ironworkers Local Union 68 v. AstraZeneca Pharm., LP, 634 F.3d 1352, 1361
(11th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) (discussing a plaintiffs allegation of economic injury);
Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 465 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2006) (discussing the allegation
of damages at the FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) stage).
32. See, e.g., Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 499 (2000) (noting the Eleventh Circuit held that
a person does not have standing to sue under RICO unless he or she was injured by an act of
racketeering) (citing Beck v. Prupis, 162 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 1998)); Nat'l Org. for Women
v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 255-56 (1994) (citations omitted) (addressing whether individuals in a
class action had standing to bring a civil RICO claim); Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268-69 (noting that, as
a general matter, plaintiffs do not have standing when they complain of harms done to a third
person).
33. See, e.g., Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 653-60 (2008) (citations
omitted) (holding that first-party reliance is not an "indispensable requisite of proximate causation"
in a civil RICO claim).
34. See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 146 (1987)
(noting that the civil RICO statute does not have an express statute of limitations).
35. United States Supreme Court decisions are not included in the sample because there were
so few relevant decisions between 2005 and 2011. The Supreme Court rendered only six
substantive RICO decisions between 2005 and 2011. Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559
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unreported opinions are included in the database because both are needed to
accurately track trends. The database, which includes 277 cases, is analyzed in
Parts III, IV, and V of this Article (based on quantity, types, and outcome). A
smaller sample, consisting of eighty-one cases providing some analysis of RICO
issues,36 was culled from the full database and is discussed in Part VI, which
focuses on specific RICO issues.
III.

QUANTITY: HOW MANY RICO CASES ARE THERE AND WHERE ARE THEY
BROUGHT?

As Chart 1 in Appendix A-1 reveals, of the 227 RICO opinions rendered by
the federal courts of appeals between 2005 and 2011, 157 (69%) were civil
RICO cases and 70 (30%) were criminal.
This author conducted a similar
study of federal appellate RICO opinions rendered between 1999 and 2001 .38
Interestingly, the ratio of civil to criminal RICO opinions in the prior study78% civil to 22% criminal-is remarkably consistent with the ratio in the present
study. 39 The peak year for RICO decisions in the current study was 2006, with
29 decisions; however, the quantity remained steady, with an average of 22.5
d*40 . per year.
decisions
As Chart 2 in Appendix A-1 reveals, the Eleventh Circuit (with 26
decisions), Third Circuit (with 24 decisions), and Ninth Circuit (with 21

U.S. 1 (2010); Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938 (2009); Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co.,
553 U.S. 639 (2008); Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451 (2006); Scheidler v. Nat'l
Org. for Women, 547 U.S. 9 (2006). These decisions are discussed when relevant throughout this
Article and discussed extensively in Part VI. District court opinions are not included in the sample
because many of them are extremely brief-often without sufficient information to determine the
RICO conduct or issues at hand. Also, for many RICO cases, there are multiple district court
opinions rendered on the same cases during the relevant seven-year time period. Thus, excluding
district court opinions and focusing only on appellate decisions permitted a more accurate analysis
of RICO trends, not one tainted by multiple rulings in a single case. In comparison to the district
court opinions, virtually all of the federal appellate decisions rendered between 2005 and 2011 have
some substantive discussion of at least one of the RICO issues raised. Over one-third of the federal
appellate decisions contain extensive issue discussions, often critiquing and refining the analyses of
other courts, academics, and legislators. Focusing on these decisions provides rich terrain on which
to assess RICO trends.
While a number of states have RICO statutes, state court opinions were not included in the
sample because of their content, state-specificity, and highly variable frequency.
36. Many of the opinions in the full data set were brief, involving little discussion of issues.
While these opinions yield data on the quantity, type of case, and outcome, they are not helpful in
assessing issue trends.
37. See infra Appendix A-1, at Chart 1.
38.

See Pamela H. Bucy, PrivateJustice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 22 n.1 10 (2002). The federal

appellate courts rendered 185 RICO opinions between 1999 and 2001. Id. at n.111. Of these, 145
(78%) were civil RICO cases and forty (22%) were criminal RICO prosecutions. Id.
39. Id.; see also infra Appendix A-1, at Chart 1 (providing the number of civil and criminal
RICO opinions delivered between 2005 and 2011).
40. See infra Appendix A-I, at Chart 1.

220

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REvIEW

[VOL. 65: 213

decisions) dominate civil RICO cases.41 In comparison, the First (with 3
decisions), Fourth (with 5 decisions) and D.C. (with 1 decision) Circuits have
rendered the fewest civil RICO opinions.42 The Second Circuit (with 21
decisions), Sixth Circuit (with 10 decisions) and Seventh Circuit (with 7
decisions) have rendered the most criminal RICO decisions, while the First (with
2 decisions), Fifth (with 3 decisions), Eighth (with 1 decision) and D.C. (with 2
decisions) Circuits have rendered the fewest criminal RICO decisions. 43 Given
the breadth of RICO's reach, the varying quantity of criminal RICO decisions
among the circuits presumably reflects the local U.S. Attorneys' expertise in and
preference for RICO cases.
It is interesting to compare the data in the present study to the RICO data
collected by the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC).4 Both studies
show significantly more civil RICO cases than criminal RICO cases.45
Unfortunately, any further comparison to the AOC data or the conclusions from
AOC data are not possible because AOC data are collected inconsistently. The
AOC calculates the number of civil RICO cases filed per year, but counts the
number of defendants indicted in criminal RICO cases. This creates two
problems. The first problem is obvious: the AOC is comparing apples to oranges
(cases filed versus defendants charged). The second problem is that AOC data
overstate the number of criminal RICO cases, since there are almost always
multiple defendants indicted in each criminal RICO matter. However, even with
these limitations, it is revealing that AOC data-like the data in this Articleshow that civil RICO cases clearly dominate criminal RICO cases.

41. See infra Appendix A-I, at Chart 2.
42. See infra Appendix A-1, at Chart 2.
43. See infra Appendix A-1, at Chart 2.
44. The AOC data reflect that, in the following years, the following number of civil RICO
cases were filed: 1994 (902); 1995 (883); 1996 (830); 1997 (834); 1998 (779); 1999 (758); 2000
(826); 2001 (687); 2002 (793); 2003 (732); 2004 (839); 2005 (694); 2006 (683); 2007 (655); 2008
(727); 2009 (795); and 2010 (955). ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES
FOR
THE
FEDERAL
JUDICIARY
tbl.
C-2
(2001-2010),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/StatisticalTablesArchi
ve.aspx (follow "December" hyperlink for the desired year; then follow "Table C-2" hyperlink) (last
visited Sept. 20, 2013).
The AOC data reflect that, in the following years, the following number of defendants were
indicted on RICO charges: 1994 (194); 1995 (188); 1996 (181); 1997 (144); 1998 (214); 1999
(162); 2000 (157); 2001 (110); 2002 (218); 2003 (218); 2004 (156); 2005 (177); 2006 (179); 2007
(110); 2008 (166); 2009 (150); and 2010 (149).
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING
STATISTICS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FY1994-FY2010 Number of defendants in cases

filed, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/fisrc/ (follow "Number of defendants in casesfiled" hyperlink; then
select all of the years; then select the "Select by chapter and section within U.S.C. Title 18" option;
then select "96-Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations"; then select "all sections"; then
select your desired output) (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).
45. Whereas the data collected for this Article reveal an approximate 3-to-1 ratio of civil to
criminal RICO opinions rendered, the AOC data reveal an approximate 5-to-1 ratio of civil cases
filed to criminal RICO defendants indicted. See STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY, supra note 44; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 44.
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IV. TYPES: WHAT KINDS OF RICO CASES ARE BROUGHT?

As Chart 3 in Appendix B-I shows, prosecutions for gang and drug activity
significantly dominate criminal RICO cases (40 out of 66 cases, or 61%),
followed distantly by prosecutions for fraud (8 out of 66 cases, or 12%),
organized crime (7 out of 66 cases, or 11%) and bribery/extortion/public
corruption (7 out of 66 cases, or 11%).46
As Chart 4 in Appendix B-1 demonstrates, most civil RICO cases are
brought by or against businesses.47 Parsing the data in Chart 4 suggests the
following three observations. First, a large number (40%) of the civil RICO
cases are brought exactly for the purpose civil RICO was intended : suits
brought by businesses against other businesses dominate civil RICO actions. 49
"Business deals gone bad"-disagreements between former business
collaborators-account for 25% of civil RICO cases.o Suits broupht by
businesses against competitors account for 9% of civil RICO cases.
Ten
percent of civil RICO cases (investment advice and products liability cases)
involve allegtions of systemic wrongdoing by an organization or
organizations. These three uses of RICO are consistent with Congress's intent
that civil RICO would be used to combat sophisticated business frauds.53
Congress's "Statement of Findings and Purpose" for RICO refers to the "fraud"
that "drains billions of dollars from America's economy" and harms "innocent
investors and competing organizations.54 Senator Roman L. Hruska, who
helped shepherd RICO through Congress, consistently focused on RICO's
applicability to business frauds; in hearings, he referred to misconduct involving
or affecting brokerage houses and accounting firms.55

46. See infra Appendix B-1, at Chart 3.
47. See infra Appendix B-1, at Chart 4.
48. See infra Appendix B-1, at Chart 4.
49. See infra Appendix B-1, at Chart 4.
50. See infra Appendix B-1, at Chart 4.
51. See infra Appendix B-1, at Chart 4.
52. See infra Appendix B-1, at Chart 4.
53. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-1549, at 1 (1970).
54. Id.
55. 113 CONG. REC. 17,997-99 (1967) (statement of Sen. Hruska). Senator McClellan, the
sponsor of RICO, spoke about RICO's ability to respond to crime in every type of business:
accounting, banking, charities, construction, insurance, real estate, and stocks and bonds. 116
CONG. REC. 591-92 (1970) (statement of Sen. John McClellan) (quoting S. REP. No. 307, at 171
(1951)).
Senator McClellan directly addressed the objection that RICO applied beyond organized
crime:
[T]he curious objection has been raised to S. 30 ... [that it is] ... not somehow limited to

organized crime ... as if organized crime were a precise ... legal concept ... .Actually,
of course, it is a functional concept like white collar crime, serving simply as a shorthand
method of referring to a large and varying group of criminal offenses committed in
diverse circumstances.
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Second, approximately 18% of the civil RICO cases in this data set were
brought in cases for which civil RICO clearly was not intended to be used. For
example, 9% of the civil RICO cases were brought by individuals convicted of
crimes who sued law enforcement or prison officials on issues arising from their
criminal case in thinly disguised efforts to contest their criminal convictions.s5
Another 9% of the civil RICO cases were brought by individuals seeking to
address what appeared to be trivial personal disagreements.57
The third observation is that government officials-almost always federal
government officials-were involved in nearly one-fourth of civil RICO cases:
22% as defendants ("alleged wrongdoing by government officials" and "criminal
8
defendant alleging government wrongdoing") and 1%as plaintiffs.
V. OUTCOMES: WHAT HAPPENS IN RICO CASES?

Generally, who wins in a RICO action depends on whether the case is
criminal or civil. The prosecution wins most of the time in criminal RICO cases
and the defense wins most of the time in civil RICO cases. 5 9 As Chart 5 in
Appendix B-2 shows, the prosecution won in 99 % (69 out of 70) of the criminal

116 CONG. REC. 18,913 (1970) (statement of Senator John McClellan). Furthermore, Senator
McClellan noted that "[wihatever the limited occasion for the identification of a problem, the
Congress has the duty of enacting a principled solution to the entire problem." Id. at 18,914.
Representative Poff, the House sponsor of RICO, chided those who expressed concern that RICO
applied beyond organized crime:
[M]ost disturbingly, however, this objection seems to imply that a double standard of
civil liberties is permissible. S. 30 is objectionable on civil liberties grounds, it is
suggested, because its provisions have an incidental reach beyond organized crime.
Coming from those concerned with civil liberties in particular, this objection is indeed
strange. Have they forgotten that the Constitution applies to those engaged in ... white
collar or street crime?
116 CONG. REC. 35,344 (1970) (statement of Sen. Richard Poff). RICO supporters, such as the
Chamber of Commerce of the United States, and RICO critics, such as the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, understood RICO to reach white collar crime, as well as organized crime.
Hearings: Organized Crime Control, supra note 2. at 294 (statement of Sheldon II. Elsen, Comm.
Chairman, Association of Bar of City of New York) (noting that RICO "sweep[s] far beyond the
field of organizcd crime"); see 116 CONG. REC. 6,708 (1970) (statement of Sen. Richard Poff)
(noting that the association recognizes the necessity ofthe broad nature of RICO).
The author of RICO, Professor G. Robert Blakey, had consistently maintained that RICO
applies to any type of sophisticated crime, including commercial and other fraud. Blakey, supra
note 8, at 280 ("Congress fully intended ... to have RICO apply beyond ... 'organized crime' .....
to the general field of commercial and other fraud; ... Congress was well aware that it was creating
important new federal criminal and civil remedies in a field traditionally occupied by common law
fraud.").
56. See AppendixB-1.
57. See AppendixB-1.
58. See Appendices B-1 and B-2.
59. See infra Appendix B-2, at Chart 5.

2013]

RICO TRENDS: FROM GANGSTERS TO CLASS ACTIONS

223

cases in the study sample, while the defense won in 83% (131 out of 157) of the
civil cases.60
As can be seen in Chart 6 in Appendix B-2, the prevailing party remains
consistent throughout the circuits in criminal cases.61 This is not surprising,
given the consistent success by the government in criminal cases.
However, as Chart 7 in Appendix B-2 shows, the prevailing party varies
among the circuits in civil RICO cases.62 Defendants win less in the Ninth
Circuit (57% of cases) and more in the Second and Third Circuits (95% and 96%
of cases, respectively). 63
Although plaintiffs in civil cases do not win often,64 when they do win, they
win big verdicts or settlements, for example, of $218 million,s $177 million,
and $121.8 million, and attorney's fees of $29.9 million and $10.25 million.69
VI. ISSUES: WHAT DOMINATES RICO JURISPRUDENCE
Thirty-six percent (81 out of 227 of the cases in this study contain
substantive discussion of RICO issues. As Chart 8 in Appendix C-1 shows,
three issues dominate: (1) whether there is a pattern of racketeering activity, (2)
whether the plaintiffs alleged injury has been proximately caused by the
defendants' alleged conduct, and (3) whether there is a qualifying RICO
71
enterprise.71
These three issues account for 69% of all RICO issues discussed.72 The first
and third issues-pattern and enterprise-arise in criminal and civil RICO cases;
the second issue-proximate causation-arises only in civil RICO actions.

60. See infra Appendix B-2, at Chart 5.

61. See infra Appendix B-2, at Chart 6.
62. See infra Appendix B-2, at Chart 7.
63. See infra Appendix B-2, at Chart 7.
64. See infra Appendix B-2, at Chart 7.
65. In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 282 F.R.D. 92, 100 (D.N.J. 2012) (citing In re Ins.
Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2009)).
66. Liquidation Comm'n of Banco Intercontinental, S.A. v. Renta, 530 F.3d 1339, 1343-44
(11th Cir. 2008).
67. In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 248 (3d Cir. 2009).
68. Id.
69. In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 282 F.RD. at 119-20.
70. See infra Appendix C-1.
71. See infra Appendix C-1.
72. See infra Appendix C-1. Other issues regularly arising in the cases within this study
include:
Failure to Plead Predicate Acts. "Racketeering activity" consists of the crimes listed in
§ 1961(1). Crimes have elements. Failure to fully plead all elements of the alleged racketeering
activity leads to dismissal of the complaint or judgment for the defendants. See, e.g., Am. Dental
Ass'n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1293 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that the plaintiffs failed to
sufficiently plead the elements of mail fraud, the alleged underlying racketeering activity, causing
dismissal of the RICO claims); Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1292-94 (11th Cir. 2010)
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(holding that the plaintiffs failed to plead violations of the predicate acts required by RICO, leading
to dismissal of those causes of action).
Statute ofLimitations. RICO does not specify a statute of limitations, but the Supreme Court
held that a four-year statute of limitations applies. Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 552-53 (2000)
(citing Rotella v. Wood, 526 U.S. 1003 (1999) (mem.) (granting writ of certiorari); Agency Holding
Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 156 (1987)). Issues arise as to when plaintiffs
knew or should have known of the defendant's alleged racketeering activity and whether new acts
of misconduct occurred during the limitations period. See, e.g., CSX Transp. v. Gilkison, 406 F.
App'x 723, 728 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting that the plaintiffs argued the Fourth Circuit should adopt the
"separate accrual" rule for new predicate acts occurring within the statutory limitations period); Jay
E. Hayden Found. v. First Neighbor Bank, 610 F.3d 382, 386 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming that the
plaintiffs should have discovered the information that gave rise to the RICO frauds within the
statutory period, warranting dismissal).
"Reves." In Reves v. Ernst & Young, the Court held that one "must participate in the operation
or management of the enterprise itself' to be subject to liability under section 1962(c) of RICO.
507 U.S. 170, 185 (1993). Courts analyzing this issue focus on the defendants' degree of
involvement in the enterprise. See, e.g., United States. v. Fowler, 535 F.3d 408, 418 (6th Cir. 2008)
(determining that the "operation or management" test of Reves was satisfied even though there was
no proof that the defendant had a "managerial role" in the enterprise, noting that Reves is not limited
to upper management of an enterprise); Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1270 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting
that simply misrepresenting facts is not sufficient to meet the "operation or management" test of
Reves).
Preemption. In the RICO cases in this study, preemption arises most often in the context of
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 78u-4
(2006 & Supp. V 2011).
In the PSLRA, Congress barred civil actions based on "any conduct that would have been
actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities." 18 U.S.C § 1964(c) (2006). See, e.g.,
AFFCO Invs. 2001, LLC v. Proskauer Rose, LLP, 625 F.3d 185, 189-90 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting §
1964(c)) (holding that ownership interests in a LLC created by a tax shelter, the subject of a RICO
fraud action, were securities and, thus, barred under the PSLRA). Other RICO cases raise the issue
of whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which prevents Congress from interfering with the states'
regulation of insurance, preempts RICO actions alleging insurance fraud. See, e.g., Weiss v. First
Unum Life Ins. Co., 482 F.3d 254, 269 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that the McCarran-Ferguson Act did
not bar plaintiffs RICO action and finding that RICO claims "do[] not and will not impair New
Jersey's state insurance scheme").
Reliance. In Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., the Supreme Court held that first-party
reliance is not required in RICO cases alleging mail fraud as the predicate acts. 553 U.S. 639, 660
(2008) (quoting Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 478 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part)). The Court noted, however, that "at least third-party reliance [may
be needed] in order to prove causation." Id. at 659.
Type ofInjury. Plaintiffs in civil RICO actions must allege economic injury arising from the
defendant's actions. Cf Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985) ("[The
plaintiff... can only recover to the extent that, he has been injured in his business or property by
the conduct constituting the [RICO] violation."). This requirement comes from the language of
section 1964(c), which gives a private cause of action to "[any person injured in his business or
property." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006). See, e.g., Ironworkers Local Union 68 v. Astrazeneca
Pharm. LP, 634 F.3d 1352, 1363 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting that the plaintiff must show that the
prescription of a particular drug was "unnecessary or inappropriate according to sound medical
practice" in order to establish an economic injury under RICO); Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont
De Nemours & Co., 431 F.3d 353, 363 (9th Cir. 2005) (indicating that the plaintiff alleged the
economic injury was being "duped into accepting low settlements").
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All three issues arise from RICO elements. This is not surprising, as all
three of these elements are unusually amorphous and non-intuitive as statutory
terms. Difficulty in applying these elements to real-world situations is part of
the reason RICO has been misused, overused, underused, and generally
maligned.73 However, the evolution of these elements during the seven years of
this study has been significant. The courts, especially the Supreme Court, have
added structure to these concepts, making RICO easier and more predictable for
litigants and courts.74
It is interesting to note which courts are discussing these issues. Most of the
circuits have had fairly equal experience handling the pattern issue. As Chart 9
in Appendix C-2 reflects, the Second, Third, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have
all rendered extensive discussions of pattern during the study period (with 4
cases each), followed by the Fourth Circuit (with 3 cases), and the Sixth and
Eleventh Circuits (with 2 cases each). 75 The First, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits
(with 1 case each), as well as the Fifth and D.C. Circuits (with no cases), 6 have
little experience dealing with the pattern issue.
As Chart 10 demonstrates, the Third Circuit has the most experience (with 5
cases) dealing with the enterprise issue, followed by the Second and Seventh
Circuits (with 4 cases each), and the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits (with 3 cases
each).77 As with the pattern issue, the Sixth, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits (with 1
case each), followed by the First, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits (with no cases), have
little experience with the enterprise issue. 78
As Chart 11 in Appendix C-4 demonstrates, the Ninth Circuit has the most
experience with the proximate causation issue (with 6 cases), followed by the
Second and Eleventh Circuits (with 4 cases each), and the Third and the Seventh
Circuits (with 3 cases each). 7 9 The Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits (with 1 case
each), and the First, Fourth, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits (with no cases) have the
least experience with the proximate causation issue.80
Thus, overall, the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits have the most
experience dealing with the three most common RICO issues while the First,
Fifth, and D.C. Circuits have the least.81 This presents two interesting

73. See Pamela Bucy Pierson, RICO, Corruption and White-Collar Crime, 85 TEMP. L. REV.
524, 568-69 (forthcoming 2013).
74. See, e.g., Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 945-49 (2009) (citations omitted)
(clarifying enterprise); Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268-74 (1992) (footnote
omitted) (citations omitted) (clarifying proximate cause); H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S.
229, 250 (1989) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2006)) (clarifying pattern).
75. See infra Appendix C-2, at Chart 9.
76. See infra Appendix C-2, at Chart 9.
77. See infra Appendix C-3, at Chart 10.
78. See infra Appendix C-3, at Chart 10.
79. See infra Appendix C-4, at Chart 11.
80. See infra Appendix C-4, at Chart 11.
81. See infra Appendix C-2. at Chart 9; infra Appendix C-3. at Chart 10; infra Appendix C-4.
at Chart 11.
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observations. The Fourth Circuit, which otherwise has no experience dealing
with the RICO issues of enterprise and proximate causation, has some
considerable experience with the pattem issue. 2 The Ninth Circuit, which has
very little experience with RICO issues concerning pattem and enterprise, hasby a wide margin-the most experience dealing with the proximate causation
issue. 83
A. "Pattern"ofRacketeeringActivity
One must engage in a pattern of racketeering activity before RICO liability
attaches. 84 Section 1962(a) prohibits investing the proceeds from a pattern of
racketeering in an enterprise.
Additionally, § 1962(b) prohibits acquiring or
maintaining control of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.
Section 1962(c) prohibits conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity. 87 Finally, § 1962(d) prohibits conspiring to do
any of these acts.88 Determining whether "racketeering activity" is present is
fairly straightforward: one simply looks to the list of racketeering activities in
§ 1961(1).
This list includes generic state offenses and approximately 150
specifically listed federal statutes.9 0 Determining whether a pattem of
racketeering activity exists, however, is more complicated. Section 1961(5) of
RICO provides a minimal definition of pattern of racketeering activity,
characterizing it as "at least two acts of racketeering activity ... within ten
years."91
The beginning point of pattern analysis is the Supreme Court's 1989
decision in H.J Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.92 Although the pattem
issue was the most frequently litigated RICO issue during the seven-year time
period (from 2005 to 2011),9 it is the easiest to analyze, primarily because the
Court's guidance in HJ. Inc. is straightforward. 94 As a result, analysis by the
federal appellate courts on the pattern issue is simply an application of HJ Inc.,
and the outcome of this issue is predictable.

82. See infra Appendix C-2, at Chart 9; infra Appendix C-3, at Chart 10; infra Appendix C-4,
at Chart 11.
83. See infra Appendix C-2, at Chart 9; infra Appendix C-3, at Chart 10; infra Appendix C-4,
at Chart 11.
84. 18 U.S.C. §1962(a) (2006).
85. Id.
86. §1962(b).
87. § 1962(c).
88. § 1962(d).
89. §1961(1).
90. Id.
91. § 1961(5) (emphasis added).
92. 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
93. See infra Appendix C-1.
94. See H.J Inc., 492 U.S. at 237-50 (citations omitted).
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1. Supreme Court Guidance
In 1989, acknowledging that "definitional problems ... in interpreting
RICO's pattern requirement inevitably lead to uncertainty re arding the statute's
scope," 9 the Supreme Court tackled the pattern requirement. 6 Customers of the
defendant, Northwestern Bell Telephone Company, brought a putative class
action alleging that the defendant paid bribes to members of the Minnesota
Public Utilities Commission (MPUC) to obtain higher (and allegedly unfair)
rates. 97 The district court dismissed the complaint. 98 The Eighth Circuit
affirmed the dismissal on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a
pattern of racketeering activity. 99
The Supreme Court reversed.100
Characterizing pattern as a "flexible concept,"101 the Court looked to RICO's
legislative history and held "that to prove a pattern of racketeering activity a
plaintiff or prosecutor must show that the racketeering predicates are related, and
that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.102
The Court then expounded on "relatedness" and "continuity."l 03 The
relatedness aspect is present if the "criminal acts . . . have the same or similar

purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise
are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events." 104
The continuity requirement should, the Court explained, "derive from a
commonsense, everyday understanding of RICO's language," 05 and may be
shown "in a variety of ways." 106 Continuity is "both a closed- and open-ended
concept, referring either to a closed period of repeated conduct, or to past
conduct that by its nature projects into the future with a threat of repetition."1 0 7
The Court noted that closed-ended continuity may be shown "by proving a series
of related predicates extending over a substantial period of time," and that
"[p]redicate acts extending over a few weeks or months ... do not satisfy this
requirement."1os Open-ended continuity, on the other hand, may be shown by a

95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 241 n.3.
Id. at 232.
Id. at 233.
Id. at 234 (citing H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 648 F. Supp. 419 (D. Minn. 1986), aff'd,

829 F.2d 648 (8th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 492 U.S. 229 (1989)).

99. Id. at 234-35 (quoting H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co. 829 F.2d 648, 650 (8th Cir. 1987),
rev'd,492 U.S. 229 (1989)).
100. Id. at 235.
101. Id. at 246.
102. Id. at 239.
103. Id. at 239-43 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1982), repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-473,
§ 212(a)(1)2), 98 Stat. 1837, as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-182, § 2, 101 Stat. 1266).
104. Id. at 240 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1982), repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-473,
§ 212(a)(1)-(2), 98 Stat. 1837, as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-182, § 2, 101 Stat. 1266).
105. Id. at 241.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 242.
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"distinct threat of long-term racketeering activity, either implicit or explicit," 109
such as a "specific threat of repetition" or a "showing that the predicate
acts ... are part of an ongoing entity's regular way of doing business."1 0 The
Court also specifically addressed the issue of whether multiple schemes are
necessary to find sufficient continuity."' It rejected the position of a number of
the courts of appeals-including the Eighth Circuit in the case before it-that a
single scheme could never constitute sufficient continuity to find a pattern.112
The Court deemed this rigid rule inappropriate, since such rigidity "introduc[ed]
a new and perhaps more amorghous concept into the analysis that had] no basis
in text or legislative history."'
Applying its principles of continuity to the case before it, the Court looked
to the petitioners' allegations that "at different times over the course of at least a
6-year period the ... respondents gave five members of the MPUC numerous
bribes, in several different forms, with the objective ... of causing these
commissioners to approve unfair and unreasonable rates ...

."114

The court held

that it was error to affirm the dismissal of the petitioners' complaint because
their allegations sufficiently pled relatedness and continuity to allow the
petitioners to prove a pattern of racketeering activity.115
2. Application by the Courts ofAppeals
As Chart 12 in Appendix C-2 reflects, the federal courts of appeals have
increasingly dealt with the pattern issue over the past seven years.
Review of
the pattern analyses in these cases yields the following observations. First, most
of the cases addressing the pattern issue resolve it with a simple application of
H.i Inc., making clear that HJ. Inc. is the governing precedent on the RICO
pattern issue.'
The second observation from the pattern cases concerns the
actual application of HJ.Inc.: the duration of the alleged racketeering activity is
determinative, in almost every instance, when courts assess the continuity prong
of the pattern requirement.11 One simply counts the months or years in which

109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 240.
112. Id. at 240-41 (footnote omitted).
113. Id. at 241 n.3 (quoting Barticheck v. Fid. Union Bank/First Nat'l State, 832 F.2d 36, 39
(3d Cir. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
114. Id. at 250.
115. Id.
116. See infra Appendix C-2, at Chart 12.
117. See, e.g., United States v. Bergrin, 650 F.3d 257, 267 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting H.. Inc.,
492 U.S. at 239-42; United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1104 (3d Cir. 1990)) (discussing the
H.J.Inc. test); U.S. Airline Pilots Ass'n v. AWAPPA, LLC, 615 F.3d 312, 318-20 (4th Cir. 2010)
(footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (applying the H.! Inc. test to determine that the plaintiffs
failed to allege a pattern of racketeering due to a lack of continuity).
118. See, e.g., Bergin, 650 F.3d at 270 (finding that closed-ended continuity existed over a
period of six years); Roger Whitmore's Auto. Servs., Inc. v. Lake Cnty., Ill., 424 F.3d 659, 673 (7th
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the alleged activity continued. The third observation is that, despite the Supreme
Court's admonition that multiple schemes are not required to find pattern, the
federal appellate courts tend to hold otherwise. 19 The fourth observation is that
courts use the pattern requirement as a litmus test to assess a more complex
question: whether RICO is being used appropriately or inappropriately in a
particular case.120 The following subsections discuss these observations.
a. Application ofH.J. Inc.
A review of the decisions addressing the pattern issue yields three
observations. First, most of the opinions rendered by the federal appellate courts
on the pattern issue during the past seven years are short and simple applications
of H.i Inc., and resolution of the pattern issue tends to be predictable. 12 1 The
clarity and predictability of the pattern jurisprudence is in contrast to the existing
jurisprudence on the other dominant issues in RICO cases-the RICO enterprise
element and whether proximate causation is shown. The Supreme Court has
provided only minimal guidance on the difficult enterprise issue and has done so
only recently (in 2009). 22 The courts of appeals have not yet sorted out this
guidance, leaving the RICO enterprise issue in a state of confusion. The
relatively settled nature of the pattern issue also contrasts to the existing
precedent on the proximate causation issue. On this issue, the Supreme Court
has decided a complex trilogy of cases that the courts of appeals have not yet
sorted out.123 The clarity and predictability of the pattern jurisprudence,
however, should be reassuring to litigants. Litigants and courts should be able to
accurately assess the merits of a case on this issue.
Second, most of the decisions on the pattern issue are highly fact-specific,
which is consistent with the Supreme Court's admonition that the pattern

Cir. 2005) (holding that a scheme that lasted two years and had a definitive ending point-an
election-did not rise to the level of continuity required by the H.J. Inc. test).
119. See, e.g., U.S. Airline Pilots Ass'n, 615 F.3d at 319, 320 (citation omitted) (affirming
dismissal of complaint alleging racketeering activity with a "single goal").
120. See, e.g., Foster v. Wintergreen Real Estate Co., 363 F. App'x 269, 274 (4th Cir. 2010)
(noting that if the court were to "adopt such a [broad] characterization [of pattern], [it] would
transform every such dispute into a cause of action under RICO" (quoting Flip Mortg. Corp. v.
McElhone, 841 F.2d 531, 538 (4th Cir. 1988))); Al-Abood ex rel. Al-Abood v. El-Shamari, 217
F.3d 225, 238 (4th Cir. 2000) ("[W]e are cautious about basing a RICO claim on predicate acts of
mail and wire fraud... .This caution is designed to preserve a distinction between... gardenvariety fraud claims ... and ... a more serious scope of activity.").
121. See, e.g., Bergrin, 650 F.3d at 267 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co.,
492 U.S. 229, 239, 240, 241, 242 (1989); Pungitore,910 F.2d at 1104 (3d Cir. 1990)) (applying the
H.J. Inc. test); U.S. Airline Pilots Ass'n, 615 F.3d at 318-20 (4th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted)
(finding no pattern ofracketeering activity under the H.J.Inc. test).
122. See Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938 (2009).
123. See Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008); Anza v. Ideal Steel
Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451 (2006); Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992).

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

230

[VOL. 65: 213

analysis will "depend[] on the specific facts of each case." 124 In addressing the
"relatedness" prong, the federal appellate courts use the "factors" set forth in
H1 Inc.-purpose, result, participants, victims, and methods of commission-to
assess relatedness.125 Lastly, most of the decisions in civil RICO cases resolve
the pattern issue against civil plaintiffs, finding that the allegations did not meet
H1 Inc.'s mandate of relatedness and continuity.126
b.

Longevity

The length of the alleged racketeering activity is the key factor in courts'
resolution of the continuity prong of the pattern requirement. Courts have held
that two years,127 sixteen months,128 and seven monthsl29 were not long enough
to find "closed-ended" continuity. "Open-ended continuity" cannot be shown
without explicit threats of future racketeering activity.130 Such specificity was
rare in the reported cases. Thus, effectively, if racketeering activity did not last
more than two years, or explicit threats did not exist, continuity could not be
shown and the pattern requirement was not met. Conversely, pattern was found
whenever the alleged activity extended over several years.

124. H.J Inc., 492 U.S. at 242.
125. See, e.g., Brown v. Cassens Transp. Co., 546 F.3d 347, 354 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting H.J.
Inc., 492 U.S. at 240) (finding the defendant's alleged acts to be related because they satisfied each
of the H.J. Inc. factors); United States v. Brandao, 539 F.3d 44, 55 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting H.i
Inc., 492 U.S. at 240) (finding sufficient relatedness between shootings to constitute a pattern); see
also Jennings v. Auto Meter Prods., Inc., 495 F.3d 466, 473 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Morgan v.
Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 975 (7th Cir. 1986)) (using factors similar to the H.J. Inc. factors
to find that there was no pattern ofracketeering).
126. See, e.g., ISystems v. Spark Networks, Ltd., 428 F. App'x 368, 373-74 (5th Cir. 2011)
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2006)) ("[The plaintiff] did not allege conduct that constitutes a pattern
of racketeering under RICO.... The alleged fraudulent misrepresentations ... do not threaten
reh'g granted and opinion withdrawn, No. 10-10905, 2012 WL
long-term criminal activity .... ),
3101672 (5th Cir. Mar. 21, 2012); Zahl v. N.J. Dep't of Law and Pub. Safety Div. of Consumer
Affairs, 428 F. App'x 205, 211 (3d Cir. 2011) ("[Plaintiff's allegations of fraud] are clearly
insufficient plausibly to allege that the defendants engaged in 'long-term criminal activity.'"); Rao
v. BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., 589 F.3d 389, 399 (7th Cir. 2009) ("[Plaintiffs] complaint merely
restates the elements of section 1962(a) in boilerplate fashion .... Accordingly, the district court
properly dismissed this claim.").
127. Roger Whitmore's Auto. Servs., Inc. v. Lake Cnty., 111., 424 F.3d 659, 673 (7th Cir.
2005).
128. Spool v. World Child Int'l Adoption Agency, 520 F.3d 178, 184 (2d Cir. 2008).
129. Kaye v. D'Amato, 357 F. App'x 706, 716 (7th Cir. 2009).
130. See H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 242.
131. See, e.g., United States v. Bergrin, 650 F.3d 257, 270-71 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations
omitted) (six years); United States v. Eppolito, 543 F.3d 25. 57-58 (2d Cir. 2008) (citations
omitted) (eight years).
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c. Single or Multiple Schemes
Although the Court in H.J Inc. determined that a single scheme could
potentially constitute a pattern of racketeering activity,132 the lower courts have
indicated reluctance to find the existence of a pattern if there is only a single
scheme to defraud. 133 The Tenth Circuit's decision in Bixler v. Foster1 34 is
indicative of this trend. In that case, minority shareholders of a uranium mining
company sued the company's directors and attorneys, alleging fraud in the
transfer of company assets.13 5 The Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the action
on several grounds, including failure to allege that a pattern of racketeering
activity existed.136 Noting that "[a] viable RICO claim requires a showing of
continuity plus relationship,"13 7 the court held that the plaintiffs' complaint
"faile[d] to show any threat of future criminal conduct" and thus failed to meet
the continuity prong. 38 The court reasoned that the complaint "allege[d] that
defendants engaged in a single scheme to accomplish the discrete goal of
transferring ... uranium mining interests .. "3
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a RICO action brought by
one group of pilots against another group of pilots because there was only a
"single goal" of the alleged racketeering activity. 140 The two groups disagreed
over calculations of seniority after the merger of US Airways and American
West Airlines. 14 1 One group, the union USAPA, alleged that the other group, the
American West Airlines Pilots Protective Alliance (AWAPPA), engaged in
extortion and sabotage against the United States Airline Pilots Association
(USAPA).142 USAPA brought a RICO action, seeking injunctive relief and
Since the conduct
damages.143 At issue was the continuity prong of pattern.
alleged by AWAPPA spanned only a few weeks, there was no question,

132. H.J Inc., 492 U.S. at 237.
133. See, e.g., Bixler v. Foster, 596 F.3d 751, 761 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Boone v. Carlsbad
Bancorporation, Inc., 972 F.2d 1545, 1556 (10th Cir. 1992)) (affirming dismissal of complaint
alleging that defendant engaged in a single scheme); U.S. Airline Pilots Ass'n v. AWAPPA, LLC,
615 F.3d 312, 319 (4th Cir. 2010) (affimning dismissal of complaint alleging racketeering activity
with a "single goal").
134. 596 F.3d 751 (10th Cir. 2010).
135. Id. at 754.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 761 (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
138. Id. (quoting Boone v. Carlsbad Bancorporation, Inc., 972 F.2d 1545, 1556 (10th Cir.
1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
13 9. Id.
140. See U.S. Airline Pilots Ass'n v. AWAPPA, LLC, 615 F.3d 312, 319 (4th Cir. 2010).
141. Id. at 315.
142. Id. at 316.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 318-20.
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according to the Fourth Circuit, that closed-ended continuity was not present.145
Nor, according to the Fourth Circuit, was open-ended continuity shown, since
the alleged racketeering activity had a "built-in ending point ...." 14 6 The court
found it compelling that the complaint alleged the defendants' single goal was
"to destroy USAPA and render it incapable of discharging its legal duty to
represent the US Airways pilots."14 7 The Fourth Circuit held that completion of
the goal would end the threat to USAPA and, thus, end any threat of open-ended
continuity.148
d. Pattern as a RICO Litmus Test
The pattern requirement appears to be used by courts as the benchmark for
determining whether a case truly warrants use of the powerful RICO statute or
whether it is simply "garden-variety" fraud, or otherwise too frivolous for

RICO.149
Foster v. Wintergreen Real Estate Co., is is indicative of this usage. One
issue in Foster centered on the failure to disclose a noisy stump grinder.151 The
plaintiffs, who purchased resort lots for investment purposes, sued the
Wintergreen Real Estate Agency for "fail[ing] to disclose that there was a noisy
stump grinder operating next to property [the plaintiffs had] purchased., 152 The
plaintiffs also alleged certain additional lapses by the real estate agency: failure
to prepare color brochures, hold open houses, put up "for sale" signs, and
advertise the sale properties. 153 The plaintiffs therefore argued that at least some
of these lapses constituted the racketeering activities of wire and mail fraud.15 4
The Fourth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that
the plaintiffs failed to show pattern.1s Emphasizing that RICO was not designed
for garden variety fraud claims, 156 the court noted that the pattern requirement
limits RICO to "ongoing unlawful activities whose scope and persistence pose a
special threat to social well-being."157 In this way, the pattern requirement limits
RICO to significant frauds: "The pattern requirement is important because [i]n

145. See id. at 318 ("[Plaintiff] does not contend that the factual allegations ... satisfy the
Supreme Court's standard for closed-ended continuity.").
146. Id. at 319.
147. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
148. See id.
149. See Al-Abood ex rel. Al-Abood v. El-Shamari, 217 F.3d 225, 238 (4th Cir. 2000).
150. 363 F. App'x 269 (4th Cir. 2010).
151. Id. at 271.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 271 n.3.
154. See id. at 271.
155. Id. at 276. The court also held that the plaintiffs did not have standing because the
Lanham Act prohibited consumers from suing for false advertising. Id. at 275.
156. See id. at 274 (quoting Al-Abood ex rel. Al-Abood v. El-Shamari, 217 F.3d 225, 238 (4th
Cir. 2000)).
157. Id. at 273 (quoting Al-Abood, 217 F.3d at 238).
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providing a remedy of treble damages ... Congress contemplated that only a
party engagin in widespread fraud would be subject to such serious
consequences."
The court expressed a special concern with a RICO action
based on mail fraud or wire fraud, stating it was "cautious about basing a RICO
claim on predicate acts of mail and wire fraud because it will be the unusual
fraud that does not enlist the mails and wires in its service at least twice."159
Thus, the Fourth Circuit did not disturb the findings of the district court that the
plaintiffs' allegations were too speculative and, thus, that pattern of racketeering
activity did not exist:
When considering the alleged scheme at issue ... it does not appear to
be the type of social evil meant to be addressed by RICO. While
Plaintiffs allege the scheme was directed at other victims besides
themselves, those allegations are too speculative to support a finding of
a pattern of racketeering activity."160
United States v. Bergrinl 6 1 is similarly instructive, even though the court
reached the opposite conclusion. Paul Bergrin, a licensed attorney and former
federal prosecutor, was indicted for using his law firm to commit murder,
attempted murder, bribery, prostitution, money laundering and mortgage
fraud. 62 The district court dismissed all of the RICO counts in the thirty-nine
count indictment returned against the defendants, holding that the indictment
failed to adequately allege a pattern of racketeering activity. 63
Relying on the pattern requirement, the Third Circuit concluded that Bergrin
and his conspirators were properly indicted for criminal RICO violations. 16 4 The
Third Circuit reversed, concluding that the indictment met both the relatedness
and continuity prongs of pattern.1 5 According to the Third Circuit, relatedness
was shown by the allegations of "the same or similar purposes" of the alleged
racketeering activities.
The common purpose was "promoting and enhancing
the Bergrin Law Enterprise [BLE] and its leaders', members' and associates'

158. Id. (quoting Menasco, Inc. v. Wasserman, 886 F.2d 681, 683 (4th Cir. 1989)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
159. Id. at 274 (quoting Al-Abood, 217 F.3d at 238) (internal quotation marks omitted).
160. Id. at 271-72. (quoting Foster v. Wintergreen Real Estate Co., No. 3:08CV00031, 2008
WL 4829674 (W.D. Va. Nov. 6, 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted), af'd, 363 F. App'x 269
(4th Cir. 2010)).
161. 650 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2011).
162. Id. at 261-62.
163. Id. at 263 (quoting United States v. Bergrin, 707 F. Supp. 2d 503, 519 (D.N.J. 2010),
rev'd, 650 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2011)). In this case, the court also addressed the issue of whether the
indictment alleged a RICO enterprise. Id. (quoting Bergrin, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 519). The district
court held that it did not. Bergrin, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 519. The Third Circuit reversed, finding that
enterprise was adequately alleged. Bergrin, 650 F.3d at 268.
164. Id. at 268-69, 271.
165. Bergrin, 650 F.3d at 270.
166. Id.
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activities; enriching the leaders, members and associates of the Bergrin Law
Enterprise; and concealing and otherwise protecting the criminal activities of the
Bergrin Law Enterprise." 167 Closed-ended continuity was shown, since the
racketeering activity allegedly extended over six years.168
Open-ended
continuity was also shown because "the alleged number of schemes and the
BLE's apparent willingness to engage in criminal acts to aid Bergrin's clients
suggest ed] that there [was] also a threat of continu[ing] criminal activity in the
future."

Whereas the district court focused on the variety of crimes chargedincluding prostitution, murder, and mortgage fraud-and found that their
dissimilarity negated a finding of pattern,170 the Third Circuit concluded that the
many alleged crimes were linked by their common purpose. 1 According to the
Third Circuit, "RICO's pattern requirement ensures that separately performed,
functionally diverse and directly unrelated predicate acts and offenses will form
a pattern under RICO, as long as they all have been undertaken in furtherance of
one or another varied purposes of a common organized crime enterprise." 17 2
e.

Concluding Observations

In conclusion, during the past seven years, the pattern issue has been the
most frequent RICO issue addressed by the federal appellate courts. 17 3 Standing
alone, the pattern requirement-like other RICO terms-is fairly vague and nonintuitive when compared to the statutory terms in most criminal statutes. Yet,
more than other RICO elements-certainly those litigated regularly in RICO
cases-the Supreme Court has provided effective clarity and guidance on the
pattern requirement, rendering this RICO element predictable.
The Court's
1989 decision in H.J Inc. accomplished this by setting forth the two prongs:
relatedness and continuity. 1 75 The lower federal courts use these prongs to focus
on objective, observable facts, such as how long racketeering activity continued
and whether one or more schemes was involved.
Perhaps because the pattern
requirement is now so well-defined, it has become a helpful gauge for the courts

167. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
168. Id.
169. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
170. Bergrin, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 506, 512-13.
171. Bergrin, 650 F.3d at 271.
172. Id. (quoting United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 566 (3d Cir. 1991)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
173. See infra Appendix C-1.
174. See H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989).
175. See id.
176. See, e.g., Bergrin, 650 F.3d at 270 (noting that the defendants collectively engaged in six
different schemes over the course of six years); Boone v. Carlsbad Bancorporation, Inc., 972 F.2d
1545, 1556 (10th Cir. 1992) (citing Sil-Flo, Inc. v. SFHC, Inc., 917 F.2d 1507, 1516 (10th Cir.
1990)) (finding that a single scheme which accomplished a discrete goal was not the type of activity
that RICO was enacted to address).
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in assessing when RICO is being used appropriately-or inappropriately-in a
particular case.
B. Enterprise
1. Statutory Guidance
RICO defines enterprise as "any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity." 17 7 This definition recognizes that
an enterprise may be an existing, formal structure-such as a corporation-or a
group of individuals who come together only for sporadic activities.178 The
latter category is known, in RICO parlance, as an "association in fact"
enterprise.
Courts have dealt with this definition of enterprise on numerous occasions.
The jurisprudence focuses on two issues. The first issue concerns what type of
relationship defendants must have to the alleged enterprise.180 This is known as
the "distinctness" issue. The second issue concerns what is needed to show the
existence of an "association in fact" enterprise.
For most of RICO's existence, the lower courts-especially the district
courts-have interpreted the enterprise element narrowly,18 while the Supreme
Court has interpreted RICO enterprise broadly.
The Supreme Court has held

177. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2006).
178 See id.
179. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 581-82 (1981).
180. See, e.g., Official Publ'ns, Inc. v. Kable News Co., 884 F.2d 664, 668 (2d Cir. 1989)
(citing Bennett v. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 770 F.2d 308, 315 (2d Cir. 1985); B.F. Hirsch v. Enright
Ref. Co., 751 F.2d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1984), abrogation recognized by Jaguar Cars, Inc. v. Royal
Oaks Motor Car Co., 46 F.3d 258 (3d Cir. 1995); Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of
Chi., 747 F.2d 384, 401-02 (7th Cir. 1984), af'd on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985))
(discussing the necessity of distinctness for certain RICO violations); Landry v. Air Line Pilots
Ass'n Int'l AFL-CIO, 901 F.2d 404, 425 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2006); Liquid
Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1307 (7th Cir. 1987); Bishop v. Corbitt Marine Ways, Inc., 802
F.2d 122, 123 (5th Cir. 1986)) (requiring distinctness for some RICO violations but not for others).
181. See, e.g., Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583 ("[Enterprise] is proved by evidence of an ongoing
organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a
continuing unit.").
182. Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541, 545 (9th Cir. 2007) ("There has been some
judicial resistance to RICO, manifested in narrow readings by lower federal courts.").
183. See, e.g., Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 950-51 (2009) (noting that the Supreme
Court has traditionally favored an expansive view of the statute); Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem.
Co., 553 U.S. 639, 660 (2008) (refusing to adopt narrow constructions of RICO); Nat'l Org. for
Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 257 (1994) ("RICO broadly defines 'enterprise."); Sedima
v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 (1985) (stating that RICO is to be read broadly); Turkette, 452 U.S.
at 590 (1981) (declining to interpret RICO narrowly).
Congress directed that RICO should be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947
(1970).
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that "[t]here is no restriction upon the associations embraced by the definition [of
enterprise]," 184 that an "inclusive" definition of enterprise is consistent with the
"new domain of federal involvement" created by RICO,is8 and that even a
"loosely and informally organized"18 6 group may qualify as a RICO enterprise;
thus, the definition of enterprise has a "wide reach."187 As discussed in Part VII,
many of the Court's rulings on enterprise are quite favorable to plaintiffs. 188
Chart 13 in Appendix C-3 addresses the frequency with which the federal
appellate courts discuss the "enterprise" issue.189
2. Distinctness
The enterprise distinctness issue becomes relevant only when one type of
RICO conduct is alleged. As noted above, RICO covers four types of
conduct. 190 Section 1962(a) prohibits a person from investing the proceeds of
racketeering activity in an enterprise.191 Additionally, § 1962(b) prohibits a
person from acquiring or maintaining control over an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity.192 Section 1962(c) prohibits a person "employed
by or associated with" an enterprise from conducting or participating in the
affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. 193 Finally,
§ 1962(d) prohibits conspiring to violate §§ 1962(a), (b), or (c).194
Section 1962(c) describes the conduct that is, by far, the most common
RICO conduct alleged;195 it is also where the distinctness issue arises. Section
1962(c), unlike the other RICO sections, limits "persons" who may be charged to
persons "employed by or associatedwith the enterprise."196 By comparison, any

184. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580.
185. Id. at 586.
186. Boyle, 556 U.S. at 941.
187. Id. at 944; see also Nat'1 Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 257 (1994)
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2006)) (discussing the statute's breadth).
188. See infra Part VII.
189. See infra Appendix C-3, at Chart 13.
190. See supra Part I.
191. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2006). RICO further requires that the enterprise must not be one
that is "engaged in, or the activities ofwhich affect, interstate or foreign commerce." § 1962(a)-(c).
192. §1962(b).
193. § 1962(c) (emphasis added).
194. §1962(d).
195. See RAKOFF & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, §1.06[3]. This is because the elements of
§§ 1962(a) and (b) are more difficult to prove. To establish a § 1962(a) case, one must trace
proceeds "invested" in an enterprise, as well as prove that a pattern of racketeering activity and
enterprise exists. See § 1962(a). To establish a § 1962(b) case, one must prove that defendants
"acquired or maintained control" over an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. See §
1962(b). By comparison, in a § 1962(c) case, one must simply prove that a defendant who was
associated with or employed by an enterprise participated in or conducted the affairs of the
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. See §1962(c).
196. §1962(c) (emphasis added).
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person may be charged with violations of §§ 1962(a), (b) or (d. 197 Because one

cannot logically be employed by or associated with oneself,19 courts have held
that a defendant who is charged with violating § 1962(c) must be separate and
distinct from the enterprise through which the defendant is alleged to have
conducted a pattern of racketeering activity.199 Since most RICO cases are
brought under § 1962(c), the distinctness issue has dominated much of the RICO
jurisprudence. 200
By limiting the persons who can violate § 1962(c), this section essentially
ensures that it will be used to pursue those individuals who are "insiders" of an
organization, and who use an organization and its resources to commit
racketeering activity.201 This becomes obvious when one examines the RICO
cases pursued under each section. In cases arising under § 1962(a), which
prohibits the investment of the proceeds of racketeering activit in an enterprise,
the enterprise is often the passive receptacle of ill-gotten gains. 02 In these cases,
the racketeering activity has already been committed; thus, the enterprise could

197. See § 1962 (a), (b), (d). The courts are split on whether the person and enterprise must be
distinct in § 1962(b) cases. Compare Official Publ'ns, Inc. v. Kable News Co., 884 F.2d 664, 668
(2d Cir. 1989) (suggesting § 1962(b) requires distinctness), with Landry v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n
Int'l AFL-CIO, 901 F.2d 404, 425 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding that § 1962(b) does not require
distinctness).
However, the courts agree that § 1962(a) does not contain a distinctness requirement. See,
e.g., Schofield v. First Commodity Corp. of Bos., 793 F.2d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1986) ("[Sjection
1692(a) does not require a relationship between the person and the enterprise...."); Garbade v.
Great Divide Mining & Milling Corp., 831 F.2d 212, 213 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing Haroco, Inc. v.
Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi., 747 F.2d 384, 402 (7th Cir. 1984), af'd on other grounds,473
U.S. 606 (1985)) ("[C]ombination liability can only occur when the corporation actually is the
direct beneficiary of the pattern of racketeering activity.").
198. See Haroco,747 F.2d at 400.
199. Id. (citing United States v. Computer Scis. Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1190 (4th Cir. 1982),
overruled by Busby v. Crown Supply, Inc., 896 F.2d 1181, 1190 (4th Cir. 1990); Parnes v. Heinold
Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 23 (N.D. 111. 1982)).
200. See RAKoFF & GOLDSTEIN, supranote 3, § 1.06[3].
201. See Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 259 (1994) ("[S]ubsection (c)
connotes generally the vehicle through which the unlawful pattern of racketeering activity is
committed, rather than the victim of that activity.").
There has been considerable discussion since RICO was passed as to whether the enterprise is
the "conduit" or "victim" in various RICO offenses. The courts ultimately ruled that RICO does not
require that the enterprise serve a particular role for any offense, but that generally in § 1962(c)
offenses, the enterprise will be the conduit for the pattern of racketeering activity. See United States
v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1273 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Scheidler, 510 U.S. at 259).
202. Philip A. Lacovara & David P. Nicoli, Vicarious CriminalLiability of Organizations:
RICO as an Example of a Flawed Principle in Practice,64 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 725, 762 (1990)
("Under subsection (a), the enterprise plays the role of 'prize' of outside criminal interests or, at
worst, a passive instrument, when criminal interests are ensconced inside the enterprise and use it as
the receptacle of their 'dirty' money."); cf United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 584-85 (1981)
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a), (c) (2006)) (stating that § 1962(a) RICO cases "address the infiltration
by organized crime of legitimate businesses," and that "[tihe aim is to divest the association of the
fruits of its ill-gotten gains," but that, ultimately, § 1962 can apply to both legitimate and
illegitimate enterprises).
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not have been used to commit the racketeering activity. Similarly, in cases
arising under § 1962(b), which prohibits acquiring or maintaining control over
an enterprise through racketeering activity, 20 the enterprise is the passive victim
of whoever acquired or maintained control over it.20 4
Because civil RICO cases-more so than criminal RICO cases-tend to
involve legal entities, such as corporations, the distinctness analysis becomes
more complicated in civil RICO cases. Corporate law issues of ownership,
control, and identity must be addressed and reconciled with RICO principles.
Additionally, pleading issues are always more complex in civil RICO cases,
where plaintiffs hope to sue a "deep pocket." 205 A legal entity has greater assets
and insurance coverage than most individuals, and thus is the obvious deep
pocket and defendant. However, any legal entity involved in the alleged
racketeering activity is also the obvious "enterprise." 2 06 Charging an entity as a
defendant while also meeting the distinctness requirement can be challenging.207
Unfortunately, RICO jurisprudence is littered with poorly reasoned and
incorrect holdings on distinctness when legal entities are involved. As a
result, RICO's potential as a weapon against [fraud and] white collar
crime has not been realized, many inappropriate civil RICO actions have
been brought, and RICO has earned a reputation as a problem statute. 2 08
This reputation is unfortunate given RICO's potential as an effective tool to
combat business frauds. As this author has noted elsewhere, there are simple
ways to clear up the confused case law on the enterprise distinctness issue.209
The Supreme Court has shown the way, but the lower courts now need to follow
the Court's lead.2 10

203. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (2006).
204. See Lacovara & Nicoli, supra note 202, at 763 ("Indeed, it is hard to fathom how a
legitimate business enterprise could be the 'perpetrator' or 'central figure' in the criminal activity
contemplated under section 1962(b).").
205. See Ryan C. Morris, Proximate Cause and Civil RICO Standing: The Narrowly
Restrictive and MechanicalApproach in Lerner v. Fleet Bank and Baisch v. Gallina, 2004 B.Y.U.
L. REv. 739, 751 (2004) (noting that civil RICO "rests on proving that the defendant violated the
criminal RICO provisions, an understanding of which requires examining a complex maze of cross
references").
206. See Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi., 747 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir.
1985), aff'd on other grounds,473 U.S. 606 (1985) (citing 18 U.S.C. §1961(4) (2006)).
207. The distinctness issue does not arise regularly when individuals, as opposed to collective
entities, are involved. Because collective entities are comprised of individuals, the lines of identity
are blurrier in cases involving collective entities. As the Fifth Circuit noted, "[Tlhe courts have
routinely required a distinction when a corporation has been alleged as both a RICO defendant and a
RICO enterprise, but a similar requirement has not been mandated when individuals have been
named as defendants and as members of an association-in-fact RICO enterprise." St. Paul Mercury
Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 224 F.3d 425, 447 (5th Cir. 2000).
208. Pierson, supra note 73, at 560.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 553.
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3. Association in FactEnterprises
As noted previously, RICO defines enterprise as "any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or
group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity."211 In the
2009 case of Boyle v. United States,2 12 the Supreme Court addressed the
italicized portion of this definition and clarified what is necessary to prove an
"association in fact" enterprise.213 Eddie Boyle was convicted by a jury on
eleven of twelve counts2 1 charging him with bank burglary, attempted bank
burglary, conspiracy to commit bank burglary, violations of RICO (under §
1962(c)), and RICO conspiracy.215 Trial evidence showed that Boyle and others
committed a number of bank burglaries and attempted bank burglaries in four
states over the course of five years.2 16 Using crowbars, fishing gaffes, and
walkie-talkies, Boyle and his confederates targeted night deposit boxes at banks
in retail shopping areas.217 They broke into the boxes, stole the money, and split
the proceeds.
Boyle argued that he and his group of alleged confederates were
too loosely organized to constitute an association in fact enterprise under

RICO. 219
The Supreme Court affirmed Boyle's conviction, concluding that an
association in fact enterprise existed even though Boyle's burglary group "was
loosely and informally organized,... without] a leader or hierarchy ... [or]
long-term master plan or agreement," 0 and functioned only sporadically.
According to the Court, "nothing in RICO exempts an enterprise whose
associates engage in spurts of activity punctuated by periods of quiescence." 22 2
Noting that RICO's statutory definition of enterprise is "obviously broad," and
"expansive," and has "a wide reach," 2 23 the Court held that an association in fact
enterprise is simply a "continuing unit that functions with a common
purpose."224 According to the Court, an association in fact enterprise must have
"at least three structural features: a purpose, relationships among those
associated with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit these associates
to pursue the enterprise's purpose." 2 25

211. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2006) (emphasis added).
212. 556 U.S. 938 (2009).

213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. at 948 (citing United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981)).
Id. at 943.
Id. at 941-42.
See id. at 941.

217. Id.

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id.
Id. at 947-48.
Id. at 941.
See id.
Id. at 948.
Id. at 944 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2006)).
Id. at 948 (citing United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981)).
Id. at 946.
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In many instances, purpose, relationships, and longevity will be easy to
establish.226 The Court specifically noted that evidence establishing the
existence of an association in fact enterprise may simply be evidence of the
racketeering activity. 22 7 The Court also noted that "the existence of an
association-in-fact [enterprise] is oftentimes more readily proven by what is [sic]
does, rather than by abstract analysis of its structure." 2 2 8
C. Proximate Causation
The Supreme Court has rendered three major opinions on proximate
causation: Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporationin 1992,229 Anza
v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp. in 2006,230 and Hemi v. City ofNew York in 2010.231
Together, these decisions provide a roadmap for plaintiffs aiming to prove
proximate causation in civil RICO cases. Part VI.C. 1 discusses these decisions,
and Part VI.C.2 analyzes their application in the courts of appeals.
As Chart 14 in Appendix C-4 reflects, the federal appellate courts' attention
to proximate cause peaked in 2010.232 Given the necessity of showing proximate
cause in civil RICO cases, it is likely that this issue will remain a major issue for
the courts.
1. The Supreme Court'sRoadmap: Holmes-Anza-Hemi
a. Holmes v. SIPC
The plaintiff in Holmes was the Securities Investor Protection Corporation
(SIPC), a private nonprofit corporation. 23 3 Most broker-dealers registered under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are required to be members of the SIPC. 23 4
Broker-dealers are assessed fees that go into a fund used by the SIPC to pay
losses sustained by broker-dealers' customers if a broker-dealer "fail[s] or is in
danger of failing to meet its obligations to customers." 235 In July 1981, the SIPC
sought protective decrees for two broker-dealers, one located in Florida and

226. Cf United States v. Hutchinson, 573 F.3d 1011, 1022 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Boyle,
556 U.S. at 944) (acknowledging that the "requirements for an enterprise are modest").
227. Boyle, 556 U.S. at 947 (quoting Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583) ("[Tlhe evidence used to
prove the pattern of racketeering activity and the evidence establishing an enterprise may in
particular cases coalesce.") (internal quotation marks omitted)).
228. Id. at 951 (internal quotation marks omitted).
229. 503 U.S. 258 (1992).
230. 547 U.S. 451 (2006).
231. 559 U.S. 1 (2010).
232 See infra Chart 14 and Appendix C-4.
233. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 261 (1992).
234. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. §78ccc(a)(2)(A)).
235. Id. (quoting §78eee(a)(3)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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another located in California. 2 36 After the SIPC placed the two broker-dealers
under trustee supervision, the trustees liquidated the broker-dealers, and the
SIPC eventually paid $13 million to the broker-dealers' customers for losses.237
Thereafter, the SIPC sued Robert Holmes and seventy-five others under civil
RICO, alleging that Holmes and his seventy-five conspirators engaged in a
fraudulent stock manipulation scheme that led to the bankruptcT of the two
broker-dealers and ultimately caused the SIPC to lose $13 million.
The district court entered partial summary judgment for Holmes, holding
that the SIPC had not shown that its loss was proximately caused by Holmes's
alleged action. 2 39 The Ninth Circuit reversed in part, concluding that proximate
causation was shown.2 40 The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit. 24 1 The
Court first addressed the question of what causation standard applied in civil
RICO actions and held that the standard was proximate causation.
Turning to
the case before it, the Court agreed with the district court that the SIPC had not
shown proximate causation.243
The Court began its analysis by focusing on the statutory language in §
1964(c), which provides a civil cause of action for "[a]ny person injured in his
business or property by reason of a violation of [RICO] ... .'.44 Acknowledging

that the language "by reason of a RICO violation" did not clarify whether a "butfor" or "proximate causation" standard applied,245 the Court examined the
statutory history of civil RICO. 2 4 6 The Court found it significant that the
Clayton Act-upon which civil RICO is based-was interpreted at the time of
RICO's passage as requiring proof of proximate causation, as well as but-for
causation.247 The Court reasoned, "[W]e may fairly credit the 91st Congress,
which enacted RICO, with knowing the interpretation federal courts had given
the words earlier Congresses had used .... 24
Thus, the Court held that "proximate cause is ... required" for a civil RICO
plaintiff to prevail. 24 9 This standard, the Court explained, requires RICO civil
plaintiffs to prove "some direct relation between the injury asserted and the

236. Id. at 262.
237. Id. at 262-63.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 263-64.
240. Id. at 264 (citing Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Vigman, 908 F.2d 1461, 1467-69 (9th Cir.
1990), rev'd,Holmes, 503 U.S. at 258 (1992)).
241. Id. at 265 (citing Holmes, 499 U.S. at 974 (1991) (granting certiorari)).
242. Id. at 268.
243. Id. at 276.
244. Id. at 265 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
245. See id. at 265-66.
246. Id. at 267.
247. Id. at 268 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006)) (citing Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal.,
Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 533-34, 536 (1983)).
248. Id.
249. Id.
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injurious conduct alleged." 25 0 The Court noted the policy reasons supporting a
direct injury requirement, including the difficulty of remedying indirect injuries,
and stated that "[r]ecognizing claims of the indirectly injured would force courts
to adopt complicated rules apportioning damages amon plaintiffs removed at
different levels of injury from the violative acts ... ."
As the Court noted,
"directly injured victims can generally be counted on to vindicate the law as
private attorneys general."252
In the case before it, the Court agreed that the link between Holmes's
alleged stock fraud and the SIPC's loss was "too remote." 2 53 According to the
Court, there were simply too many steps in the causal chain before the SIPC lost
its $13 million: the broker-dealers relied upon the alleged fraud for their
investment decisions; the broker-dealers went bankrupt, which could have been
caused by the alleged fraud, other factors, or some combination of the alleged
fraud and other factors; the broker-dealers' customers sustained losses; the
customers qualified under the SIPC rules for coverage of their losses; and the
SIPC paid the customers.254 Simply put, the SIPC was last in a long line of
injured parties.255 The Court further noted that recovery by the SIPC could make
it more difficult for the direct victims-the broker-dealers-to recover on their
lawsuits against Holmes. 2 56 According to the Court, this potential situation
underscored the inappropriateness of allowing the SIPC to preempt the direct
victims. 257
b.

Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Co.

Fourteen years after its decision in Holmes, the Court returned to the issue of
proximate causation under RICO in Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.25 8 Ideal
Steel Supply (Ideal), the plaintiff, was a retail seller of steel mill products,
supplies, and services, with two stores in New York City (one in Queens and one
in the Bronx). 259 Ideal sued Joseph and Vincent Anza, owners of National Steel
Supply (National)-Ideal's major competitor-under civil RICO, 26 0 alleging that
the Anzas "engaged in an unlawful racketeering scheme" by failing to collect the
required New York sales tax from its cash customers, thereby "gain[ing] sales

250. Id.
251. Id. at 269 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors,459 U.S. at 542-44).
252. Id. at 269-70.
253. Id. at 271.
254. See id.
at 271-73 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors,459 U.S. at 534).
255. See id. at 271 n.18, 274.
256. See id. at 274.
at 272-74 (quoting Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L.
257. See id.
No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 943 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C § 1964 (2006 & Supp.
2012); Associated Gen. Contractors,459 U.S. at 545).
258. 547 U.S. 451 (2006).
259. Id. at 453.
260. Id. at 453-54.
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and market share at Ideal's expense."2 61 Ideal claimed that the tax returns
National submitted to the New York Department of Taxation concealed
National's illegal practice of not collecting the required sales tax.262 Ideal further
alleged that, through this practice, the Anzas violated § 1962(c) by conducting
the affairs of National through mail fraud and wire fraud-via the submission of
the false tax returns-and that they violated § 1962(a) by "us[ing] funds
generated by their fraudulent tax scheme to open National's Bronx location." 26 3
The district court dismissed the complaint.264 The Second Circuit reversed,
concluding that Ideal adequately alleged proximate causation on both the
§ 1962(a) claim and the § 1962(c) claim.
The Supreme Court reversed on the
§ 1962(c) claim and remanded on the § 1962(a) claim. 26 6
Citing its analysis in Holmes, the Court held that the claimed RICO violation
in the current case-as in Holmes-was too attenuated from Ideal's claimed
injury.267 The Court explained that the "direct victim of [the alleged RICO
violation] was the State of New York, not Ideal," since "the State ... was being
defrauded and the State lost tax revenue as a result." 26 8 The Court also noted
that Ideal's loss of market share could have been caused by any number of
factors independent of National's alleged tax fraud, such as National's greater
efficiency in operations or better customer service or by the shrinking global
market for steel.269 According to the Court, "Ideal's lost sales could have
resulted from factors other than petitioners' alleged acts of fraud. Businesses
lose and gain customers for many reasons, and it would require a complex
assessment to establish what portion of Ideal's lost sales were the product of
National's decreased prices."27
As in Holmes, the Court noted the practical difficulties in assessing damages
when proximate causation cannot be shown.271 Referring to Ideal's theory of
injury, the Court reasoned, "[T]he element of proximate causation recognized in
Holmes is meant to prevent these types of intricate, uncertain inquiries from
overrunning RICO litigation."272 As in Holmes, the Court noted that there was a
more direct victim capable of vindicating the alleged misconduct and said that
the State of New York "[could] be expected to pursue appropriate remedies ....

261. Id. at 454 (internal quotation marks omitted).
262. Id.
263. Id. at 454-55 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a), (c) (2006)).
264. Id. at 455.
265. Id. (quoting Ideal Steel Supply Corp. v. Anza, 373 F.3d 251, 263 (2d. Cir. 2004), rev'd in
part,vacatedand remandedin part,547 U.S. 451 (2006)).
266. Id. at 462.
267. See id. at 459-61 (citing Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268-74
(1992)).
268. Id. at 458.
269. See id.
270. Id. at 459.
271. See id. at 458.
272. Id. at 460.
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There [was] no need to broaden the universe of actionable harms to permit RICO
suits by parties who [had] been injured only indirectly." 273
Significantly, the Court treated Ideal's two RICO claims differently. Noting
that "§ 1962(c) and § 1962(a) set forth distinct prohibitions, it [was] at least
debatable whether Ideal's two claims should be analyzed in an identical fashion
for proximate-cause purposes." 27 4 Thus, although the Court reversed the Court
of Appeals on Ideal's § 1962(c) claim, holding that proximate causation was not
shown, the Court remanded on Ideal's § 1962(a) claim so that the lower court
could "determine whether petitioners' alleged violation of § 1962(a) proximately
caused the injuries Ideal asserts." 27 5
c. Hemi v. City of New York
In Hemi v. City of New York,276 the most recent proximate causation RICO
case decided by the Court, the collection of taxes from online cigarette sales was
at issue. 277 Out-of-state sellers of cigarettes do not collect sales taxes. 278 Rather,
those who purchase cigarettes online from out-of-state sellers are expected to pay
applicable sales taxes to their respective jurisdictions. 2 79 To facilitate the
collection of unpaid cigarette sales taxes, Congress passed the Jenkins Act,
which requires out-of-state cigarette vendors to file reports with each state's
tobacco tax administration-listing names, addresses, and quantities of cigarettes
purchased by state residents. 28 0 These reports provide New York State, for
example, the information it needs to collect sales tax of $2.75 per pack.281
Additionally, the state of New York provides its cities, notably New York City,
with the reports it receives from cigarette vendors.282 These reports then enable
New York City to collect from its residents who purchase cigarettes from out of
state. 283
Hemi and other out-of-state cigarette sellers did not file Jenkins Act reports
with the state of New York; thus, the state was not able to provide reports to
New York City, and the city was not able to collect its $1.50-per-pack tax.284
The city sued Hemi and other out-of-state cigarette vendors for failing to supply

273. Id.
274. Id. at 462.
275. Id.
276. 559 U.S. 1 (2010) (plurality opinion).
277. See id. at 6.
278. See id. at 4.
279. See id. at 5.
280. Id. (citing Jenkins Act, ch. 699, 63 Stat. 884 (1949) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 375-378 (2006 & Supp. V 2011)).
281. Id. at 12 (citing N.Y. TAX LAW §471(1) (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2010, ch. 34)
(amended McKinney Supp. 2013)).
282. See id. at 6.
283. See id. at 5-6 (citations omitted).
284. See id.
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the state of New York with the required Jenkins Act reports.2 85 The city argued
that its injury-the inability to collect its taxes-flowed from the online sellers'
Jenkins Act violations to the state. 2 86
In a plurality opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court reversed
the Second Circuit, agreeing with the district court's dismissal of the city's
RICO claim for failure to show proximate causation.287 Finding "the [c]ity's
theory of causation ... far too indirect," 2 88 the Court determined that the state of
New York, not the city of New York, was the direct victim of Hemi's alleged
misconduct and that "[tfhe State certainly is better situated than the City to seek
recovery from Hemi."
The Court emphasized, "[O]ur precedents make clear
that in the RICO context, the focus is on the directness of the relationship
between the conduct and the harm." 2 90 Because of the remoteness of the city's
injury, the Court determined that the city's loss was too speculative.
The
Court noted that even if New York City had received the required information
from Hemi, the city did not lose anything except the "opportunity" to collect
taxes, since it was unclear whether the city would have actually collected
cigarette taxes from purchasers had the out-of-state sellers supplied the state of
New York with reports.2 92 In his dissent, Justice Breyer noted that, historically,
the city had collected only forty percent of the cigarette taxes owed by its
residents for their online cigarette purchases. 2 93
Justice Ginsburg-who concurred in the Court's judgment "[w]ithout
subscribing to the broader range of the Court's proximate cause analysis"focused on the presence of an existing regulatory scheme under the Jenkins Act
that dealt with out-of-state cigarette sellers' obligations to report sales.2 94 Justice
Ginsburg stated, "I resist reading RICO to allow [New York City] to end-run its
lack of authority to collect tobacco taxes from Hemi Group or to reshape the
'quite limited remedies' Congress has provided for violations of the Jenkins
Act." 295

285. Id.
286. Id. at 6-7. Hemi agreed for purposes of the case that Jenkins Act violations could serve
as RICO predicate acts. Id.
287. Id. at 18.
288. Id. at 10.
289. Id. at 12.
290. Id.
291. See id. at 10.
292. Id. at 15.
293. See id. at 21 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
294. Id. at 19 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part) (quoting City of New York v. SmokesSpirits.com, Inc., 541 F.3d 425, 459-60 (2d Cir. 2008)).
295. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part). The dissenting Justices in Hemi-Justices Breyer,
Stevens, and Kennedy-focused on the foreseeability of Hemi's conduct, finding that the city's loss
of cigarette taxes was "reasonably foreseeable" to Hemi and, in fact, was "desired" by Hemi to
make its product more appealing to customers. See id. at 22-23 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The
plurality countered that foreseeability was not the issue; rather, "directness of the relationship
between the [defendant's] conduct and the [plaintiff's] harm" was the key. Id. at 12 (quoting id. at
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d. Concluding Observations
As the above discussion shows, Holmes, Anza, and Hemi collectively make
the following five points. First, the standard for causation in civil RICO actions
is proximate causation.296 Second, RICO plaintiffs in civil actions must prove
that their alleged injuries are directly caused by the defendant's alleged violation
of RICO.297 This is a high and exacting burden. Third, to prove proximate
causation, RICO plaintiffs must be able to show that factors other than the
alleged RICO conduct did not contribute to their injury. 298 Fourth, RICO
plaintiffs must be able to demonstrate why they are the party best situated to
redress the alleged injury.2 99 Finally, given Justice Ginsburg's point in Hemi, it
may also be helpful for RICO plaintiffs to show that no other statutory scheme in
place was designed to redress the injury at issue.
2. Application and Guidancefrom the Courts ofAppeals
This section discusses six RICO cases decided by the federal courts of
appeals between 2005 and 2011, all of which were rendered subsequent to the
Holmes-Anza-Hemi trilogy. Together, they signal what appears to be a proplaintiff trend in the RICO proximate causation issue. This is unusual.
Historically, although the Supreme Court has generally interpreted RICO
broadly and in favor of RICO plaintiffs, the lower federal courts have not.300
Time will tell whether the lower courts will continue to analyze proximate
causation in a pro-plaintiff manner, but as the discussion below demonstrates,
they have done so since Hemi was decided in 2010.
The first two cases discussed herein are BCS Services, Inc. v. Heartwood88,
LLC 3 0 1 and Ideal Steel Supply Corp v. Anza.302 Both opinions were rendered by
the Seventh and Second Circuits, respectively, after disposition by the Supreme
Court.30 3 While the last four decisions-all alleging pharmaceutical fraudwere decided against plaintiffs, they provide clear guidance for future plaintiffs
seeking to show proximate causation under RICO, especially in pharmaceutical

fraud cases.304

24 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 470 (2006) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268
(1992)). Justice Sotomayor did not participate in the Court's consideration of the case. Id. at 18.
296. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 250-52 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 267-70 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 289-91 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 182-87 and accompanying text.
301. 637 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 2011).
302. 652 F.3d 310 (2d Cir. 2011).
303. See Ideal Steel Supply, 652 F.3d at 317; BCS Servs., 637 F.3d at 752 (citing
Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008)).
304. See discussion infra Part VI.C.2.c.
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a. When PlaintiffsHave Done Enough
In BCS Services, the Seventh Circuit applied proximate causation
requirements favorably for the plaintiffs.30 At issue in BCS Services was a tax
lien auction that was held in Cook County, Illinois, to allow people to bid on
properties for which property taxes had not been paid.306 When a property was
put up for auction, the highest bidder obtained a lien on the property and agreed
to pay the county the past-due taxes on it.3 07 The property owner was then
provided one last opportunity to reclaim the property by reimbursing the
bidder. 308 If the owner did not pay the taxes by the deadline, the bidder who
obtained the lien at the auction received the deed to the property. 3 09 Generally, if
this occurred, the bidder could then sell the property at a significant profit. 3 10
Thus, obtaining liens at the tax auction was a lucrative endeavor. There were
typically many more bidders than properties. 31' To fairly allocate bidding
opportunities, Cook County permitted only one agent of a "related entity" to
bid.3 12 As the Seventh Circuit noted, "[O]therwise a potential buyer could
The plaintiff, BCS
increase the likelihood of winning by packing the room."
Services, alleged that the defendants falsely represented that they were not
related entities when the three groups were related.314 As a result, BCS Services
claimed that, as a bidder who followed the rules, it was cheated out of more
opportunities to bid.is
The Seventh Circuit consolidated BCS Services with Phoenix Bond &
Indemnity Co. v. Bridge after Bridge was decided by the Supreme Court and
reheard by the district court. 316
31 The court noted that the Bridge suit involved the
same facts and allegations.
After rehearing Bridge, the district court
"grant[ed] summary judgment for the defendants on the ground that the plaintiffs

305. See BCS Servs., 637 F.3d at 756-58 (citations omitted) (discussing the plaintiffs burden
of proof in showing proximate causation).
306. See id. at 752-53.
307. Id. at 752.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. See id. (discussing how investors target properties that "are worth more than the past-due
taxes").
311. See id. at 752-53 (discussing the auction process for tax liens and the alleged fraud
committed by defendants in packing these auctions with between eleven and thirty-nine bidders).
312. Id. at 753.
313. Id.
314. See id.
315. See id. at 753-54.
316. See BCS Servs., 637 F.3d at 751-52 (quoting Phoenix Bond & Indem., Co. v. Bridge, No.
05 C 4095, 2005 WL 3527232, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 21, 2005), rev'd, 477 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2007),
aff'd, 553 U.S. 639 (2008)). At issue in Bridge was "whether a plaintiff asserting a RICO claim
predicated on mail fraud must plead and prove that it relied on the defendant's alleged
misrepresentations." Bridge, 553 U.S. at 641-42. The Supreme Court held that, under these
circumstances, "first-party reliance [was] not required ..... Id. at 642.
317. BCSServs., 637 F.3d at 751.
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can't prove that the fraud was a proximate cause of their alleged losses." 318 The
Seventh Circuit reversed, concluding that the plaintiffs had demonstrated
sufficient causation to survive the motion for summary judgment.319 The
Seventh Circuit began its analysis with a far-ranging discussion of the role of the
proximate causation requirement:
The doctrine of proximate cause ... protects the ability of primary
victims of wrongful conduct to obtain compensation; simplifies
litigation; recognizes the limitations of deterrence (unforeseeable
consequences of a person's acts will not influence his decision on how
scrupulously to comply with the law); and eliminates some actual or
possible but probably minor causes as grounds of legal liability.320
Turning to the case before it, the Seventh Circuit bluntly stated that "[t]he
doctrine has no application to this case ... ."321 Chastising the district court for
allowing the defendants to "throw[] sand in the ... judge's eyes," 322 the Seventh
Circuit determined that the district court had indulged the defendants in
"present[ing] ... implausible speculations concerning possible superseding
causes, and demand[ing] that the plaintiffs refute them.'
The court concluded
that "[o]nce a plaintiff presents evidence that he suffered the sort of injury that
would be the expected consequence of the defendant's wrongful conduct, he has
done enough to withstand summary judgment on the ground of absence of
causation."
b.

Business Deals Gone Bad: Time to Use § 1962(a)

The Second Circuit's analysis in Ideal Steel Supply Corp. v. Anza3 25 also
points to a potentially new, helpful avenue for plaintiffs who seek to use civil
RICO against business competitors.
Since lawsuits between business

318. See id. at 752 (internal quotation marks omitted).
319. See id. at 758-59, 761.
320. Id. at 756.
321. Id.

322. Id. at 758.
323. Id. at 757.
324. Id. at 758 (citing Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 170 F.3d 264, 271-72 (2d Cir. 1999); Kingston
v. Chi. & N. W. Ry., 211 N.W. 913, 915 (Wis. 1927); Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 816 (N.Y.
1920) (Cardozo, J.)). The Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the district court, which rendered a
jury verdict for the plaintiffs against some of the defendants on RICO violations, RICO conspiracy,
and state law tortious interference claims. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co. v. Bridge, No. 05 C 4095,
2011 WL 5978742, at *1 (N.D. 111.Nov. 29, 2011). The district court awarded the plaintiffs treble
damages and attorney's fees under RICO, as well as punitive damages on the plaintiffs' state law
claims. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co. v. Bridge, Nos. 05 C 4095, 07 C 1367, 2012 WL 8706, at *3
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 2012).
325. See 652 F.3d 310 (2d Cir. 2011).
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competitors are the second most common use of civil RICO,326 the lesson from
Anza could be particularly fruitful for plaintiffs.
As previously discussed, Ideal-the plaintiff company in Anza-alleged that
National violated both § 1962(a) and § 1962(c) by failing to collect required
taxes and underreporting income, thereby obtaining an unfair competitive
advantage over Ideal. 327 Although the Supreme Court held that Ideal did not
show proximate causation under § 1962(c), 328 the Court remanded for further
findings regarding proximate causation under § 1962(a).329
After the Supreme Court remanded the case, Ideal amended its complaint,
focusing on its § 1962(a) claim. 330 According to the amended complaint,
National filed amended tax returns upon Ideal's filing of the original RICO
complaint.33 1 Ideal alleged that these amended tax returns showed that National
had underreported its income from 1998 to 2003 by $4.3 million and underpaid
its taxes by approximately $1.7 million.332 Ideal further alleged that, in violation
of § 1962(a), National used the cash it collected by virtue of its tax fraud to
purchase a store in the Bronx.333 Because of its proximity to Ideal's location, the
new Bronx store allegedly caused Ideal to lose between $1.3 million and $1.7
million in business per year. 334
The district court, however, granted the defendants' "motions for judgment
on the pleadings, and in the alternative for summary judgment."335 The Second
Circuit reversed, holding that Ideal's amended complaint adequately alleged
proximate causation for a § 1962(a) violation. 336 Accordingly, the court
remanded the case for trial.337
In reaching its conclusion that proximate causation was shown, the Second
Circuit highlighted the differences between § 1962(a) and § 1962(c): § 1962(a)
prohibits investing the proceeds of a pattern of racketeering activity in an
enterprise, 338 while § 1962(c) prohibits any person associated with an enterprise
from conducting the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity. 339 Thus, the court reasoned that "the compensable injury flowing from
a violation of [§ 1962(c)] necessarily is the harm caused by predicate

326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

See infra Appendix B-1, at Chart 4.
Anza, 547 U.S. at 454-55.
Id. at 461.
Id. at 462.
Ideal Steel Supply Corp. v. Anza, 652 F.3d 310, 317 (2d Cir. 2011).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 317-18.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 313.
See id. at 326.
Id. at 328.
Id. at 321 (emphasis added) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2006)).
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting § 1962(c)).
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acts .. .,"340 while injury flowing from a violation of § 1962(a) is not "an injury
caused ... by the pattern of racketeering activity itself, but rather ... [from the]
investment of the proceeds of that activity." 34 1 Because the injury in § 1962(a) is
an "investment" and the harmful conduct alleged by Ideal was an "investment"
by National, the Second Circuit concluded that Ideal had adequately alleged
proximate causation:
With respect to Ideal's subsection (a) claim,

..

. the act constituting the

violation is the very act that causes the harm: the use or investment of
the funds derived from the pattern of mail and wire frauds to establish
and operate the Bronx store is both the violation and the cause of ideal's
lost sales.342
In holding that Ideal's amended RICO complaint adequately demonstrated
proximate causation, the Second Circuit assessed the district court's mistaken
judgment, stating that "as a general matter, the district court viewed the
proximate cause inquiry as the same for a claim under subsection (a) as for one
under subsection (c), and it does not appear to have given effect to the different
referents required by the different prohibitions." 343
In short, the Second Circuit's decision in Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.
demonstrates how use of § 1962(a) by plaintiffs-rather than the more widely
used § 1962(c) 344 -may make the showing of proximate causation easier for
plaintiffs.
c. PharmaceuticalFraud
The four cases discussed below involve allegations of fraud by
pharmaceutical companies marketing drugs. 34 5 The plaintiffs in all of these
cases were union health and welfare funds. 34 6 As insurers for their fund
members, the plaintiffs were obligated under their health plans to pay for the
drugs prescribed to their members by a physician.347 Either as a single plaintiff

340. Id. (quoting Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 457 (2006)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
341. Id.
342. Id. at 327.
343. Id.
344. See RAKOFF & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3,

§

1.06[3].

345. See Se. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer Corp., 444 F. App'x 401, 402 (11th
Cir. 2011); Ironworkers Local Union 68 v. AstraZeneca Pharm., LP, 634 F.3d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.
2011); United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa. & Reg'1 Health & Welfare Fund v. Amgen,
Inc., 400 F. App'x 255, 257 (9th Cir. 2010); UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121,
124 (2d Cir. 2010).
346. Se. Laborers, 444 F. App'x at 401; Ironworkers, 634 F.3d at 1352; United Food, 400 F.
App'x at 255; UFCWLocal 1776, 620 F.3d at 121.
347. See, e.g., Ironworkers, 634 F.3d at 1366 ("[The insurers had to pay regardless of the
facts surrounding that prescription . . . .").
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or in putative class actions-depending on the case-these plaintiffs sued
pharmaceutical companies for allegedly misrepresenting the efficacy, side
effects, or both the efficacy and side effects of various drugs.348 The damage
theories in the cases varied somewhat, but the argument in each was essentially
that if the defendants had not misrepresented facts about the drugs, the plaintiffs
would not have paid for the drugs or would not have paid as much as they did.349
Although the plaintiffs did not win in any of these cases, the courts provided
detailed, practical guidance for future plaintiffs regarding how to show
proximate causation in RICO claims. 3 50
i.

United Food & Commercial Workers Central
Pennsylvania & Regional Health & Welfare Fund v.
Amgen

In the 2010 case of United Food & Commercial Workers Central
Pennsylvania& Regional Health & Welfare Fundv. Amgen, 35 1 the Ninth Circuit
followed the Supreme Court's reasoning in Holmes, focusing on the steps in the
causal chain from the defendant's alleged misconduct to the plaintiffs' alleged
injury.352 At issue were two drugs-Aranesp and Epogen-used to treat anemia,
both of which were linked to serious complications in cancer patients and kidney
patients.353 Allegedly, Amgen offered kickbacks to medical providers to
increase sales of Aranesp and Epogen. 35 4
The Ninth Circuit held that "the complaint failed to plead a cognizable
theory of proximate causation that link[ed] Amgen's alleged misconduct to
Appellants' alleged injury."355 The court noted that "at least four independent
links" were present in the causal chain, including "(1) the USP-DI's [United
States Pharmacopeia Drug Information] listing of Aranesp for anemia of cancer,
(2) Medicare's decision to cover Aranesp for anemia of cancer, (3) third-party

348. See Se. Laborers, 444 F. App'x at 402; Ironworkers, 634 F.3d at 1356; UnitedFood, 400
F. App'x at 257; UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 123.
349. See Se. Laborers, 444 F. App'x at 404; Ironworkers,634 F.3d at 1356-57; UFCW Local
1776, 620 F.3d at 123.
350. See infra Part VI.C.2.c.v.
351. 400 F. App'x 255 (9th Cir. 2010).
352. Compare id. at 257 (determining that the plaintiff's complaint alleged a causal
connection that was too attenuated to satisfy the proximate cause requirement of RICO), with
Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268-74 (1992) (discussing the proximate
causation requirements for § 1962(c) RICO claims and concluding that the causal link between the
alleged stock manipulation and the harm suffered by the plaintiffs was too remote).
353. Martin Zimmerman, California and 14 Other States Sue Amgen over Anemia Drug
Aranesp, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 31, 2009, at Bi [hereinafter Zimmerman]; see Andrew Pollack, Amgen
to Pay $780 Million to Settle Suits on Its Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2011, at B4 [hereinafter
Pollack].
354. Pollack, supranote 353; Zinunerman, supranote 353.
355. United Food, 400 F. App'x at 257 (citing Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553
U.S. 639, 654-55 (2008)).
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payors' decision to cover Aranesp for anemia. . ., and (4) doctors' decisions to
prescribe Aranesp .... 356 The Ninth Circuit concluded that "the causal theory
was too attenuated to satisfy the Supreme Court's proximate causation
requirement in the RICO context." 35 7
ii.

Southeast Laborers Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer
Corp.

The Eleventh Circuit's analysis in Southeast Laborers Health & Welfare
Fund v. Bayer Corp.,358 decided in 2011, is similar to the Ninth Circuit's
analysis in United Food3 5 9
The plaintiffs alleged that Bayer had
"misrepresented or suppressed emerging information revealing serious risks
associated with the use of Trasylol." 60 Trasylol originally was developed to
treat pancreatitis. 361 It was later found to reduce excessive bleeding during
surgery and was administered to surgery patients until it became linked to kidney
damage.3 62
The plaintiff, the Southeast Laborers Health and Welfare Fund, alleged that
its damage-paying for Trasylol-was caused by Bayer's misrepresentations
that Trasylol was a safe and effective drug. 363 The Eleventh Circuit rejected this
claim of causation, finding the Fund's allegations inadequate.364 It noted that
there was no evidence connecting the Fund's decision to pay for Trasylol to the
alleged misrepresentations by Bayer.365 According to the court, "Southeast
allege[d] no facts indicating how it would have independently evaluated
Trasylol's medical appropriateness .... Thus, Southeast's supposedly 'direct
chain of causation' [was] unsupported by factual allegations." 66 The court
provided guidance for plaintiffs in future pharmaceutical fraud cases by
suggesting that to meet the direct relation requirement, complaints must
adequately allege how or why the plaintiffs chose to pay for certain drugs and
how or why the defendants' alleged improper conduct led to those payments.

356. Id.
357. Id.
358. 444 F. App'x 401 (11th Cir. 2011).
359. See supra notes 351-57 and accompanying text.
360. Se. Laborers,444 F. App'x at 402.
361. Id.
362. See id.
at 402-03.
363. See id. at 404. The Eleventh Circuit quickly rejected the plaintiffs causation theory,
stating that it amounted to "no more than a . . . 'fraud on the FDA' theory" and noting that this
theory "has been specifically rejected by the Supreme Court." Id. at 407 (citing Buckman Co. v.
Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348 (2001)). The court also rejected the plaintiff's
argument "that Bayer's alleged material omissions give rise to a presumption of causation," since it
was not raised below and, thus, was waived. Id. at 408.
364. Id. at 408.
365. See id. at 407-08.
366. Id. at 408.
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Ironworkers Local
Pharmaceuticals

Union

68

v.
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Astrazeneca

In Ironworkers Local Union 68 v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals,LLP, 367 the

plaintiffs-a number of health and welfare funds-alleged that AstraZeneca
misrepresented facts about Seroquel, an antipsychotic medication approved by
the FDA for treatment of schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. 368 AstraZeneca
had marketed and sold Seroquel as an effective treatment for autism, dementia,
Alzheimer's, and other disorders.369 Seroquel was commonly prescribed for
these disorders, even though it was not FDA-approved for such uses. 37 0 The
plaintiffs alleged that AstraZeneca's representations of Seroquel's effectiveness
and safety for these disorders were false-the drug was neither effective nor
safe. 37 1 They further alleged that AstraZeneca's misrepresentations caused
physicians to prescribe Seroquel unnecessarily, which in turn, injured the
plaintiffs-who had paid for Seroquel under the terms of their health plans. 37 2
Following the Supreme Court's approach in Anza, the Eleventh Circuit noted
that in this case-as in Anza-there was an independent factor in the causal
chain between the defendant's alleged fraud and the plaintiffs' alleged loss. 37 3 In
Anza, the independent factors were the market trends and business practices that
may have caused Ideal's loss of business to National-rather than National's
alleged wrongdoing. 37 4 Here, the independent factor was the independent
decision by each physician to prescribe Seroquel for a particular patient.37s The
court noted that physicians prescribe medications "in the exercise of their
independent professional judgment, and such judgment could be informed by
sources other than AstraZeneca's representations ... [regarding the] drug's
relative safety and efficacy." 376

367. 634 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2011).
368. Id. at 1355 & n.1.
369. Id. at 1356 n.4.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 1356.
372. Id. at 1356-57.
373. Compare id. (quoting Ironworkers Local Union No. 68 v. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP, 585 F.
Supp. 2d 1339, 1344 (M.D. Fla. 2008), affid on other grounds, 634 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2011))
(noting that the prescribing physicians' professional judgment could have been an independent
factor), with Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 459 (2006) (discussing how businesses
lose and gain customers for many reasons, any one of which could have fimctioned as an
independent factor).
374. Anza, 547 U.S. at 459 (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 27273 (1992)).
375. Ironworkers, 634 F.3d at 1359 (quoting Ironworkers, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 1344).
376. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ironworkers, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 1344) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The court also noted that the Fund's economic loss in covering Seroquel
was due to its own actuarial errors. Id. at 1364. The court also reasoned that "insurers assume[] the
risk of paying for all prescriptions of drugs covered by their policies, including medically
unnecessary or inappropriate prescriptions-even those caused by fraudulent marketing." Id.
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As the Supreme Court made clear in Anza, as long as there is an independent
factor in the causal chain, it is not possible to directly attribute the plaintiff's
injury to the defendant's alleged misconduct and, thus, not possible to show
proximate causation in a civil RICO case. 37 7 The plaintiffs in Ironworkers,
however, failed to take this into account. The problem with proving proximate
causation was that the plaintiffs' own theory of causation incorporated an
independent factor: the fact that each physician prescribed Seroquel to a
particular patient.378
iv.

UFCW v. Eli Lilly & Co.

In UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 379 a case rendered by the Second
Circuit in 2010, a number of unions and insurers who provided coverageincluding prescription drug coverage-for their insured members brought a
putative class action, alleging that Eli Lilly & Co. (Eli Lilly) misrepresented the
efficacy and side effects of Zyprexa.380 Zyprexa was originally approved by the
FDA to treat schizophrenia and later approved for the treatment of bipolar
disorder.
The plaintiffs alleged that Eli Lilly, the manufacturer of Zyprexa,
misrepresented Zyprexa's side effects and exaggerated its effectiveness.
The
district court certified the class and denied the defendant's motion for summary
judgment.383 The Second Circuit reversed, decertifying the class and holding
that the denial of summary judgment for the defendant was inappropriate.
Although the defendant prevailed in this case, the opinion provides excellent
guidance for future plaintiffs: namely, it will help them prove every step in their
causal chain and, by inference, help them construct only a causal chain that they
385
can prove.
The Second Circuit began its analysis with a discussion of reliance.
Acknowledging the Supreme Court's holding that first-party reliance is not an
element of a civil RICO cause of action based upon mail fraud or wire fraud,
the Second Circuit noted that because the plaintiffs chose to incorporate reliance
into their theory of liability, "the plaintiffs ... must prove . . . third-party

377. See Anza, 547 U.S. at 461.
378. Ironworkers, 634 F.3d at 1359 (quoting Ironworkers, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 1344).
379. 620 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2010).
380. Id. at 123.
381. Id. at 124.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 130.
384. Id. at 137.
385. See id.at 134 (rejecting plaintiffs attempt to prove a causal link because it "skips several
steps and obscures the more attenuated link between the alleged misrepresentations made to doctors
and the ultimate injury to the [plaintiffs]").
386. See id. at 132 (citing McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 222 (2d Cir.
2008)).
387. Id. (citing Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 659 (2008)).
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reliance as part of their chain of causation." 388 Further, the court noted that
because class actions may be certified only if the class members' claims may be
shown by "generalized proof,"38 9 the question becomes "whether reliance can be
shown by generalized proof."3 90
The Second Circuit described the alleged chain of causation as follows:
[I]f plaintiffs' factual allegations are correct, the chain of causation runs
as follows: Lilly distributes misinformation about Zyprexa, physicians
rely upon the misinformation and prescribe Zyprexa, TPPs [third party
payors]391 relying on the advice of PBMs [Pharmacy Benefit Managers]
and their Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committees place Zyprexa on
their formularies [lists of medications approved by TPPs for payment]
as approved drugs, TPPs failed to negotiate the price of Zyprexa below
the level set by Lilly, and TPPs overpay for Zyprexa. 3 92
This chain of causation, the court explained, "rests on the independent
actions of third and even fourth parties."
As such, it must fail.
v.

Concluding Remarks

Together, United Food, Southeast Laborers, Ironworkers, and UFCW Local
1776 provide significant guidance for plaintiffs who sue pharmaceutical
companies under civil RICO by alleging fraudulent misrepresentations of drugs
the companies manufacture or market. The theory of liability plaintiffs choose is
the key. Plaintiffs must demonstrate that their decision to pay for a particular
drug rests upon their assessment of the drug's efficacy and side effects, and that
they relied on the pharmaceutical company's representations about efficacy and
side effects in making this decision.394

388. Id. at 133 ("[R]eliance is a necessary part of the causation theory advanced by the
plaintiffs.").
389. Id. at 131-32.
390. Id. at 133.
391. The Eleventh Circuit succinctly described the role of insurers in the U.S. health care
system, referring to insurers as "entities that engage in the health insurance fimction-i.e., the
contractual assumption of a third-party's risk of future payment for health care services ....
[H]ealth benefit plans [such as labor unions and self-funded health and welfare funds] are trust
fimds established, and funded, by the labor unions to pay for the health care services received by
their enrollees . . . ." Ironworkers Local Union 68 v. AstraZeneca Pharm., LP, 634 F.3d 1352, 1355
n.1 (11th Cir. 2011).
392. Id. at 134.
393. Id. (quoting Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 15 (2010)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
394. See, e.g., id. (citing In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 253 F.R.D. 69, 193 (E.D.N.Y.
2008), rev'd and vacated, 620 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2010) (stating that plaintiffs' failure to allege that
"they relied on [the pharmaceutical company's] misrepresentations" was crucial to their theory of
liability).
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To successfully demonstrate probable cause, an insurer alleging injury
arising from a pharmaceutical company's representations about drugs must show
that its coverage decision is based on its own decisionmaking process, which in
turn, must be based on representations about the drug made by a pharmaceutical
company.395 An insurer's decision to cover a particular drug cannot be based on
a third party's independent assessment of efficacy, regardless of whether that
third party is the FDA, Medicare, or a prescribing physician.396 While FDA
proclamations, Medicare policies, or physician prescriptions may be
prerequisites to an insurer's decision to cover a particular drug, the insurer must
make its own final decision to provide coverage based upon specific
representations about the drug by its manufacturer and marketer, which the
insurer explicitly relied upon in making its decision to cover that specific
drug. 397
While creating and documenting an explicit causation trail would be
difficult-if not impossible-for many types of businesses, it should not be as
difficult for insurers or other entities-such as health and welfare funds-that
serve as insurers for their members. Health insurers and health and welfare
funds can easily document their decisionmaking process to cover a particular
drug. Insurers and funds already have existing protocols to determine drug
coverage under their plans. 3 Through Pharmacy Benefit Managers, or other
similar outsourced entities, insurers and funds already have systems in place for
establishing formularies of what drugs they will cover.399 To shore up proximate
causation-in the event a lawsuit against pharmaceutical companies later
becomes necessary-insurers and funds simply need to explicitly include one
more step in their existing coverage decision tree. After ensuring that a drug is
approved by the FDA and prescribed by a physician, insurers-through the
agents they already employ or outsource to develop formularies-should
document that they have relied upon specific representations by pharmaceutical
companies regarding efficacy and side effects in making their own, independent
decision to cover the drug.40 The specific representations should be set forth in
the coverage decision tree. With this type of documentation, insurers will be
able to meet the rigors of the proximate causation requirements if they later need
to bring a civil RICO action against pharmaceutical companies for
misrepresentations about drugs covered.

395. See, e.g., Se. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer Corp., 444 F. App'x 401, 410
(11th Cir. 2011) (holding that insurer's claim did not establish the direct causation requirement of
proximate cause because it failed to prove that the pharmaceutical company's alleged
misrepresentation affected its decision to pay for the drug in question).
396. See id. at 408.
397. See id. at 410.
398. See UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121, 126 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing
the insurers' process for compiling the formulary-the "list of medications approved for payment").
399. See id.
400. See supra notes 395-98 and accompanying text.
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d. Conclusion: Proximate Causation
The Supreme Court has provided a roadmap for plaintiffs seeking to prove
proximate causation in civil RICO actions. 40 1 Recent decisions by the courts of
appeals have provided additional guidance for this roadmap. 40 2
To prove proximate causation in civil RICO actions, plaintiffs must show
that their injury was directly caused by the defendant's alleged conduct; that
there are no independent, contributing factors to the plaintiffs injury; and that
there are no other victims more directly harmed and, thus, better able to vindicate
their rights.403 In addition, if plaintiffs use civil RICO against business
competitors, they should use § 1962(a) of RICO instead of the more commonly
used § 1962(c) since proximate causation will be easier to prove under § 1962(a)
than under § 1962(c). 04 Lastly, the way is bright if insurers, either as a single
plaintiff or in class actions, want to use RICO to sue pharmaceutical companies
for fraudulent misrepresentations about covered drugs.405 Recent decisions have
set forth exactly what insurers must do to show proximate causation in such
cases. 406
VII. CLASS ACTIONS: THE NEW FRONTIER FOR CIVIL RICO

One of the intriguing observations from this study concerns the use of RICO
in class actions. A confluence of two recent trends-RICO decisions that make
it easier to use RICO in class actions, and judicial and legislative restrictions on
punitive damage awards in general-thrusts RICO into the forefront as a new
and powerful vehicle for bringing class actions. Recent cases show that, in the
context of class actions, RICO is being used more often, more successfully, and
in larger cases.
Fifteen of the 157 civil RICO actions included in this study (10%) are class
actions.407 More than one-third of the opinions in these class actions were

401. See supra Part VI.C.1 and accompanying text.
402. See supra Part VI.C.2 and accompanying text.
403. See supra Part VI.C.1.
404. See supra Part VI.C.2.b.
405. See supra Part VI.C.2.c.
406. See supra Part VI.C2.c.
407. See Se. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer Corp., 444 F. App'x 401 (11th Cir.
2011) (pharmaceutical fraud); Ironworkers Local Union 68 v. AstraZeneca Pharm., LP, 634 F.3d
1352 (11th Cir. 2011) (pharmaceutical fraud); UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121
(pharmaceutical fraud); In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2010) (insurance
fraud); Am. Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2010) (health care
reimbursement fraud); Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2010) (employment
discrimination claims and immigration fraud); Crichton v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 392 (7th
Cir. 2009) (health insurance fraud); Longmont United Hosp. v. Saint Barnabas Corp., 305 F. App'x
892 (3d Cir. 2009) (health insurance reimbursement fraud); McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522
F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2008) (products liability for cigarettes); Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541
(9th Cir. 2007) (consumer fraud); Olaniyi v. Alexa Cab Co., 239 F. App'x 698 (3d Cir. 2007)
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rendered recently, in 2010 and 201 1.408 Plaintiffs received favorable rulings in
one-third of these class actions,409 which is a higher success rate than in civil
RICO actions overall (20%).410 Health care issues dominate the RICO class
action cases: more than half of the RICO class actions allege some type of health
411
care fraud,411 with pharmaceutical
fraud as the predominant category. 412 Using
RICO to bring pharmaceutical fraud class actions is a recent phenomenon: all of
the pharmaceutical fraud opinions in this sample were rendered in 2010 and
2011. 413 Indeed, no RICO pharmaceutical fraud decisions were rendered prior to
2010. Perhaps most telling is that all of the decisions in RICO class actions
rendered in 2011 alleged pharmaceutical fraud.4 14 As discussed earlier, this
trend of using RICO to bring class actions aimed at pharmaceutical fraud is
likely to accelerate.415
RICO has always conferred four advantages on plaintiffs in class actions.
First, damages under RICO, which include treble damages and an award of
attorney's fees and costs, can be quite large.416 RICO's damages are also
mandatory417 : they cannot be altered by courts or capped by legislatures.4 18
Second, because of the large number and variety of the predicate acts it
incorporates, RICO applies to a wide swath of conduct. 4 19 In particular, because
RICO incorporates mail and wire fraud, it applies to virtually all frauds:

(mortgage fraud); Humphrey v. United Parcel Serv., 200 F. App'x 950 (11th Cir. 2006) (consumer
fraud); Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 465 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2006) (employment
discrimination; immigration fraud); Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 2006)
(investment fraud); Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 2006) (prisoner rights).
408. See Se. Laborers, 444 F. App'x 401; Ironworkers, 634 F.3d 1352; UFCW Local 1776,
620 F.3d 121; In re Ins. Brokerage, 618 F.3d 300; Am. Dental Ass'n, 605 F.3d 1283 (2010);
Edwards, 602 F.3d 1276 (2010).
409. See UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 137; In re Ins. Brokerage, 618 F.3d at 383; Odom,
486 F.3d at 555; Williams, 465 F.3d at 1295; Denney, 443 F.3d at 268; Guerrero,442 F.3d at 708.
410. See infra Appendix B-2, at Chart 5.
411. See Se. Laborers, 444 F. App'x at 402 (pharmaceutical fraud); Ironworkers, 634 F.3d at
1356 (pharmaceutical fraud); UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 123 (pharmaceutical fraud); Am.
Dental Ass'n, 605 F.3d at 1286 (health care reimbursement fraud); Crichton, 576 F.3d at 394-95
(health insurance fraud); Longmont, 305 F. App'x at 893 (health insurance reimbursement fraud).
412. See Se. Laborers, 444 F. App'x at 402; Ironworkers, 634 F.3d at 1356; UFCW Local
1776, 620 F.3d at 123.
413. Se. Laborers, 444 F. App'x at 401; Ironworkers, 634 F.3d at 1352; UFCW Local 1776,
620 F.3d at 121.
414. See Se. Laborers,444 F. App'x at 402; Ironworkers, 634 F.3d at 1356.
415. See supra Part VI.C.2.c.
416. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006). For example, expert testimony in UFCW Local 1776
estimated that damages for the putative class ranged between $4 billion and $7.7 billion. UFCW
Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 129.
417. See § 1964(c); Judith A. Morse, Note, Treble Damages Under RICO: Characterization
and Computation, 61 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 526, 528 (1986) ("Like compensatory damages, treble
damages are mandatory once the victim establishes liability and the extent of the harm.").
418. See § 1964(c).
419. See § 1962(a)-(c); supra Part I.
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business, health care, computer, construction, financial services, etc.4 2 0 Third,
RICO provides plaintiffs with many choices of venue, since RICO claims may
be brought against defendants wherever a defendant "resides, is found, has an
agent, or transacts his affairs." 42 1 Lastly, RICO makes it easier to certify class
actions. 4 22 Recent Supreme Court RICO decisions regarding issues of first-party
reliance, enterprise, and causation, along with existing case law on RICO's
pattern requirement,423 have the combined effect-however unintended-of
making it easier to meet class action requirements of commonality and
predominance.
A. Court and Legislative Restrictions on Punitive Damages
Over the past three decades, the United States has seen efforts by courts and
legislatures to restrict punitive damages.424 For example, in 1985, only seven
states legislatively imposed limitations on punitive damages.425 By 1987,
twenty-two states had enacted such legislation. 4 26 The Supreme Court has been
especially active in restricting punitive damages. Beginning in 1996 with its
decision in BMW of North America v. Gore,427 the Court began to rein in
punitive damages by focusing on the relationship between punitive and
compensatory damages.428 The Court anchored its restrictions in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment429 and held that a punitive damage
award of $2 million was "not simply excessive, but grossly so, and therefore

420. See § 1961(1); see generally Abels v. Farmers Commodities Corp., 259 F.3d 910, 918
(8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Fin. Co., 886 F.2d 986, 991 (8th Cir.
1989)) (commenting on the breadth of mail fraud).
421. § 1965(a).
422. Cf J. Gordon Cooney, Jr. et al., Back to the Future: Civil RICO in Off-Label Promotion
Litigation, 77 DEF. COUNS. J. 168, 169 (April 2010) (citing Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d
734, 740-44 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300-04 (7th Cir.
1995)), available at http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/Cooney&LavelleCivilRICOinOffLabelPromotionLitigation april2010.pdf ("[Clivil RICO claims conceivably allow plaintiffs to
sidestep the predominating choice-of-law issues that typically prevent nationwide class actions
based on fraud or deceptive practice[s] . . .
423. See infra Part VII.B.
424. David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 39
VILL. L. REV. 363, 371 (1994).
425. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECTS OF TORT REFORM: EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES

6 (2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/55xx/doc5549/
report.pdf.
426. Id.; see generally Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 495-96 (2008) (quoting
Larsen Chelsey Realty Co. v. Larsen, 656 A.2d 1009, 1029 n.38 (Conn. 1995)) (discussing states'
efforts to prohibit or restrain punitive damages).
427. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
428. See id. at 580-81 (citing Owen, supra note 424, at 368 & n.23).
429. Id. at 568.
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unconstitutional, particularly since compensatory damages only amounted to
four thousand dollars." 430
In the 2003 case of State Farm Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell,431 the Court held
that a punitive damage award of $145 million on a $1 million compensatory
damage award was excessive. 43 2 The Court noted that "in practice, few awards
exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory
damages ... will satisfy due process."433
In the 2008 case of Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,434 the Court drew a "bright
line," holding that a 1:1 ratio of punitive-to-compensatory damages was
appropriate. 43 The Exxon Valdez, an oil tanker, ran aground in Prince William
Sound in Alaska, spilling eleven million gallons of crude oil.4 3 6 Compensatory
damages in the amount of $507.5 million were awarded,437 as well as $2.5 billion
in punitive damages. 43 8 In setting aside the punitive damage award, the Court
approved a punitive-to-compensatory ratio of 1:1. 4 39 The Court rendered a
damning discourse on punitive damages in general, noting the "audible
criticism"4 0 and the "stark unpredictability" of punitive damage awards,44'
which created "tension ... in a system whose commonly held notion of law rests
on a sense of fairness .... 44 2 Although the Court's ruling in Exxon Shipping
Co. was limited to maritime cases, its reasoning was not.44 3 The Court spoke of
the hazards of punitive damage awards in general, and not simply in the context
of maritime punitive damage awards. 44 4
The implication of the BMW-State Farm-Exxon Shipping trilogy is that any
punitive damage award that exceeds compensatory damages is hifhly suspect,
violates due process, and is vulnerable to reduction to a 1:1 ratio.
Coupling
this judicial trend with state legislative efforts to cap punitive damages makes
RICO's mandatory treble damages and costs newly attractive for plaintiffs'
attorneys.

430.
431.
432.
433.

Id. at 611 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (referencing the majority's decision).
538 U.S. 408 (2003).
Id. at 429.
Id. at 425.

434. 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
435. Id. at 513.
436. Id. at 478.
437. Id. at 515.
438. Id. at 481.
439. Id. at 515.
440. Id. at 497.
441. Id. at 499.
442. Id. at 502.
443. See id. at 499-515 (citations omitted) (discussing punitive damages generally).
444. See id. The Court also cited to statistical data beyond maritime cases. Id. at 495-96 &
n.12.
445. See supra notes 430-34 and accompanying text.
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B. Recent RICO Jurisprudence Makes It Easier to Meet Class Action
Requirements
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) Rule 23, which governs class
actions, requires "sufficient unity so that absent class members can fairly be
bound by decisions of class representatives." 446 FRCP Rule 23(a) also requires
the following for class certification:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims
or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.447
Once the prerequisites in FRCP Rule 23(a) are met, a class may be certified
only if the standards in FRCP Rule 23(b) are also met.448 FRCP Rule 23(b)(3)
requires "the court [to] find[] that the questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy." 44 9
Recent Supreme Court rulings on reliance enhance RICO's ability to meet
the commonality and predominance requirements in class actions. It is wellestablished that plaintiffs must prove reliance in fraud cases: "It has long been
settled ... that only the recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation may recover
for common-law fraud, and that he may do so, if, but only if... he relies on the
misrepresentation in acting or refraining from action."45 This requirement of
first-party reliance makes it more difficult to find commonality, as required in
FRCP Rule 23(a), and predominance, as required in FRCP Rule 23(b). Plaintiffs
must present individualized proof to show that each and every plaintiff relied
upon a defendant's misrepresentation.45 1
In Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., which was decided in 2010, the
Supreme Court held that first-party reliance need not be proven in civil RICO
actions where mail fraud is the alleged racketeering activity. 4 52 Writing for the

446. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1997).
447. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
448. Windsor, 521 U.S. at 614.
449. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
450. Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 650 (2010) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 537 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
451. See Martinelli v. Petland, Inc., 274 F.R.D. 658, 662 (D. Ariz. 2011) ("Because the Court
and a jury could not simply assume that every class member relied on [defendant's] alleged
representations in making his or her purchase decision, individual proof of reliance would be
necessary.").
452. Bridge, 553 U.S. at 653 (quoting Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 476
(2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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majority, Justice Thomas reasoned that because mail fraud-a statutory
offense-was "unknown to the common law" 453 and did not contain a first-party
reliance element, it was not bound by common law interpretations of fraud.
The Court stated that "Congress chose to make mail fraud, not common-law
fraud, the predicate act for a RICO violation." 455 Therefore, "a plaintiff asserting
a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud need not show, either as an element of its
claim or as a prerequisite to establishing ?roximate causation, that it relied on the
defendant's alleged misrepresentations.
By freeing RICO actions based on mail or wire fraud from proof of firstparty reliance, the Court has, almost certainly unintentionally, conferred a
significant advantage on using RICO-instead of common law fraud-to bring
class actions. With RICO, plaintiffs will not need to individualize their proof to
show that any plaintiff, much less an entire class of plaintiffs, relied on a
defendant's misrepresentation.457
The second area in which the Supreme Court has made it easier to meet the
commonality and predominance requirements with RICO is with its rulings on
RICO enterprise.
As noted previously, RICO requires proof of an
enterprise 4 5 9 : that a defendant invested the proceeds of racketeering activity in an
enterprise;460 that a defendant acquired or maintained control over an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity;461 that a defendant who is employed
by or associated with an enterprise conducted the affairs of the enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity;462 or that a defendant conspired to do
463
A RICO enterprise may be a legal entity, such as a
any of these activities.
corporation, or it may be "any ... group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity." 4 64 This latter option is known as an association in

fact enterprise.465
As noted above, in Boyle v. United States,466 the Supreme Court rejected
lower courts' limiting interpretations of RICO's association in fact enterprise and
solidified a broad interpretation of enterprise by holding that a RICO enterprise
exists even if a group is "loosely and informally organized;" has no master plan,

453. Id. at 652.
454. Id. at 653 (quoting Anza, 547 U.S. at 476 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part)).
455. Id.
456. Id. at 661.

457. See id.
458. See supra Part VI.B.
459. See supra Part VI.B.
460. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2006).
461. See §1962(b).
462. See §1962(c).
463. See § 1962(d).
464. § 1961(4).
465. See supra Part VI.B.3.
466. 556 U.S. 938 (2009).

2013]

RICO TRENDS: FROM GANGSTERS TO CLASS ACTIONS

263

agreement, or hierarchy; or entails activities that are only conducted
sporadically.4 67
The Court's ruling in Boyle permits plaintiffs to prove that far-flung actors
are part of the enterprise. 4 68 The more actors involved, the easier it is to show
that many individuals (i.e., class members) have been impacted by an
enterprise's conduct. In this way, a broad interpretation of enterprise makes it
easier to show commonality and predominance and enlarges potential class
members.
The third area in which Supreme Court rulings have made it easier to show
commonality and predominance pertains to RICO's requirement that there be a
pattern of racketeering activity. As discussed above,469 in H.j Inc. V.
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., the Court held that "a pattern of racketeering
activity" is shown if "criminal acts ... have the same or similar purposes,
results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events." 470
Thus, to meet the pattern requirement in a RICO case, it becomes necessary and
relevant to show how seemingly disparate actors, actions, events, and victims are
related. 4 7 1 This requirement of relatedness will dovetail with proving
commonality among members.
In short, these holdings-that first-party reliance is not required, that
enterprise may consist of far-flung actors, and that RICO requires proof of a
pattern of activity-make it necessary, relevant, and easier to prove commonality
among seemingly disparate acts by defendants and impacts on plaintiffs. The
Third Circuit's opinion in In re Insurance Brokerage Antitrust Litigation472 is
one example of this. In that case, the court specifically relied on the enterprise
and pattern requirements of RICO to approve class certification and settlement in
a class action suit involving bribery and kickbacks in obtaining insurance
coverage. 47 3 The court noted that proof of an "association in fact" enterprise
"would encompass common questions of law and fact ... including whether
activities that constitute racketeering were taking place through the
enterprise."4 74 The court similarly concluded that RICO's pattern requirement
helped the plaintiffs show commonality and predominance, stating that "whether
these racketeering activities were recurring such that a pattern could be
established" "would encompass common questions of law and fact ... .475

467. See id. at 941, 948; see also supraPart V1.B.3.
468. See supra Part VI.B.3.
469. See supra Part VI.A.1.
470. 492 U.S.C. 229, 240 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e)
(1982) (repealed 1984)).
471. See supra notes 102-04, 124-25 and accompanying text.
472. 579 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2009).
473. See id. at 270, 278.
474. Id. at 270.
475. Id.
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In conclusion, because of the breadth of conduct to which RICO applies and
the venue and choice of law opportunities it confers, RICO has always offered
some advantages to plaintiffs seeking to bring class actions. However, because
of two recent, seemingly unrelated but parallel trends-restrictions on punitive
damages by legislatures and courts, and a series of Supreme Court decisions on
RICO elements-RICO is a new and especially promising vehicle for bringing
class actions. With the Supreme Court's apparent mandate that most punitive
damages will be confined to a 1:1 ratio to compensatory damages, RICO's
mandatory treble damages, attorney's fees and costs are more appealing than
ever. 47 6 Supreme Court decisions on reliance, enterprise, pattern, and proximate
causation, especially those rendered in 2009 and 2010, make RICO even more
helpful in proving commonality and predominance. 4 77 For all of these reasons,
RICO should be poised to thrive in the class action arena.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

This Article began with a question: Why is RICO used so infrequently? It is
a worthy question. RICO is an imaginative tool that was designed to address
complex wrongdoing. Such tools are needed. Yet RICO has been used
relatively little and maligned much. Accordingly, this Author undertook a study
of federal appellate decisions on RICO rendered between 2005 and 2011, which
has yielded interesting observations and an answer to the question initially
posed.
First, this Author made the following observations. Most RICO cases are
civil, 4 7 8 involve business disagreements between former associates or
competitors, 4 79 and are resolved in favor of the defense.480 About one-fourth of
RICO cases are criminal prosecutions,481 most of which are aimed at gang and
drug activities;482 the government prevails in almost all of these cases.483
Considerable differences exist among the circuits regarding their experience with
RICO and outcomes in RICO cases. The Eleventh Circuit rendered the largest
number of civil RICO decisions during the seven-year study,485 while the Second

476. See supra Part VII.B.
477. See generally Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1 (2010) (requiring a direct
relationship between the conduct and the harm to satisfy the proximate cause element of a RICO
claim); Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938 (2009) (allowing for a broad definition of "association
in fact" enterprise); Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008) (holding that a
party bringing a civil RICO action alleging mail fraud as the racketeering activity does not need to
prove first party reliance).
478. See infra Appendix A-1, at Chart 1.
479. See infra Appendix B-1, at Chart 4.
480. See infra Appendix B-2, at Chart 5.
481. See infra Appendix A-I, at Chart 1.
482. See infra Appendix B-1, at Chart 3.
483. See infra Appendix B-2, at Chart 5.
484. See infra Appendix B-2. at Chart 5.
485. See infra Appendix A-I, at Chart 2.
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Circuit rendered the greatest number of criminal RICO decisions.486 Defendants
in civil RICO cases win less often in the Ninth Circuit"87 but most often in the
Second, Third, and Eleventh Circuits. 4 88 The government wins most of the
criminal RICO cases in all of the circuits. 4 89
Three issues have dominated RICO case law: pattern, enterprise, and
proximate causation. 4 90 All three issues have been clarified considerably by the
Supreme Court in recent years, with the result that RICO jurisprudence-which
has been mired in confusion for most of RICO's forty-year existence-is finally
maturing into a workable body of law.
Additionally, a significant percentage of the civil RICO cases are class
actions.491 This trend is likely to accelerate. Recent case law development on
the issues of proximate causation, reliance, pattern, and enterprise have made
RICO civil actions easier to prove and the class action requirements of
commonality and predominance easier to show.
And so, the answer to the question emerges. Criminal RICO is not used
much because it has outgrown its usefulness. Civil RICO has not been used
much because it has not yet grown into its usefulness. However, it appears that
civil RICO's time to thrive has arrived.

486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.

See infra Appendix A-I, at Chart 2.
See infra Appendix B-2, at Chart 8.
See infra Appendix B-2, at Chart 7.
See infra Appendix B-2, at Chart 7.
See infra Appendix C-1.
See supra note 407 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX A-I
Number of Criminal and Civil RICO Cases
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Types of Criminal RICO Cases
2005-2011
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APPENDIX B-2
Overall Outcome of Criminal and Civil RICO Cases
In all Federal Courts of Appeals
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Frequency of RICO issues: Cumulative
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APPENDIX

Dicussion of Issues by Federat Circuit
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APPENDIX C-3
Discussion of issues by Federal Circuit
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Discussion of Issues by Federal Circuit
2005-2011
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APPENDIX D- 1
Chronology of RICO Class Actions
2005-2011
Chart 15

IQ

9-4

I
aI

A
~

/
/

*~.

/

7

~~

2

0
2000

2000

2000

LOS

2010

20±1

